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Abstract
A strategy is obviously dominant if, for any deviation, at any information set
where both strategies first diverge, the best outcome under the deviation is no bet-
ter than the worst outcome under the dominant strategy. A mechanism is obviously
strategy-proof (OSP) if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies. This
has a behavioral interpretation: A strategy is obviously dominant iff a cognitively
limited agent can recognize it as weakly dominant. It also has a classical interpreta-
tion: A choice rule is OSP-implementable iff it can be carried out by a social planner
under a particular regime of partial commitment.
1 Introduction
Dominant-strategy mechanisms are often said to be desirable. They reduce participation
costs and cognitive costs, by making it easy for agents to decide what to do.1 They
protect agents from strategic errors.2 Dominant-strategy mechanisms prevent waste
from rent-seeking espionage, since spying on other players yields no strategic advantage.
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1Vickrey (1961) writes that, in second-price auctions: “Each bidder can confine his efforts and at-
tention to an appraisal of the value the article would have in his own hands, at a considerable saving in
mental strain and possibly in out-of-pocket expense.”
2For instance, school choice mechanisms that lack dominant strategies may harm parents who do not
strategize well (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2008).
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Moreover, the resulting outcome does not depend sensitively on each agent’s higher-order
beliefs.
These benefits largely depend on agents understanding that the mechanism has an
equilibrium in dominant strategies; i.e. that it is strategy-proof (SP). Only then can
they conclude that they need not attempt to discover their opponents’ strategies or to
game the system.3
However, some strategy-proof mechanisms are simpler for real people to understand
than others. For instance, choosing when to quit in an ascending clock auction is the same
as choosing a bid in a second-price sealed-bid auction (Vickrey, 1961). The two formats
are strategically equivalent; they have the same reduced normal form.4 Nonetheless,
laboratory subjects are substantially more likely to play the dominant strategy under a
clock auction than under sealed bids (Kagel et al., 1987). Theorists have also expressed
this intuition:
Some other possible advantages of dynamic auctions over static auctions
are difficult to model explicitly within standard economics or game-theory
frameworks. For example, . . . it is generally held that the English auction
is simpler for real-world bidders to understand than the sealed-bid second-
price auction, leading the English auction to perform more closely to theory.
(Ausubel, 2004)
In this paper, I model what it means for a mechanism to be obviously strategy-proof.
This approach invokes no new primitives. Thus, it identifies a set of mechanisms as
simple to understand, while remaining as parsimonious as standard game theory.
A strategy Si is obviously dominant if, for any deviating strategy S
′
i, starting from
any earliest information set where Si and S
′
i diverge, the best possible outcome from S
′
i
is no better than the worst possible outcome from Si. A mechanism is obviously strategy-
proof (OSP) if it has an equilibrium in obviously dominant strategies. By construction,
OSP depends on the extensive game form, so two games with the same normal form may
differ on this criterion. Obvious dominance implies weak dominance, so OSP implies SP.
This definition distinguishes ascending auctions and second-price sealed-bid auctions.
Ascending auctions are obviously strategy-proof. Suppose you value the object at $10.
If the current price is below $10, then the best possible outcome from quitting now is
3Policymakers could announce that a mechanism is strategy-proof, but that may not be enough. If
agents do not understand the mechanism well, then they may be justifiably skeptical of such declarations.
For instance, Google’s advertising materials for the Generalized Second-Price auction appeared to imply
that it was strategy-proof, when in fact it was not (Edelman et al., 2007).
4This equivalence assumes that we restrict attention to cut-off strategies in ascending auctions.
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no better than the worst possible outcome from staying in the auction (and quitting
at $10). If the price is above $10, then the best possible outcome from staying in the
auction is no better than the worst possible outcome from quitting now.
Second-price sealed-bid auctions are strategy-proof, but not obviously strategy-proof.
Consider the strategies “bid $10” and “bid $11”. The earliest information set where these
diverge is the point where you submit your bid. If you bid $11, you might win the object
at some price strictly below $10. If you bid $10, you might not win the object. The
best possible outcome from deviating is better than the worst possible outcome from
truth-telling. This captures an intuition expressed by experimental economists:
The idea that bidding modestly in excess of x only increases the chance
of winning the auction when you don’t want to win is far from obvious from
the sealed bid procedure. (Kagel et al., 1987)
I produce two characterization theorems, which suggest two interpretations of obvious
strategy-proofness. The first interpretation is behavioral: Obviously dominant strategies
are those that can be recognized as dominant by a cognitively limited agent. The second
interpretation is classical: Obviously strategy-proof mechanisms are those that can be
carried out by a social planner with only partial commitment power.
First, I model an agent who has a simplified mental representation of the world:
Instead of understanding every detail of every game, his understanding is limited by
a coarse partition on the space of all games. I show that a strategy Si is obviously
dominant if and only if such an agent can recognize Si as weakly dominant.
Consider the mechanisms in Figure 1. Suppose Agent 1 has preferences: A  B 
C  D. In mechanism (i), it is a weakly dominant strategy for 1 to play L. Both
mechanisms are intuitively similar, but it is not a weakly dominant strategy for Agent 1
to play L in mechanism (ii).
In order for Agent 1 to recognize that it is weakly dominant to play L in mechanism
(i), he must use contingent reasoning. That is, he must think through hypothetical
scenarios: “If Agent 2 plays l, then I should play L, since I prefer A to B. If Agent
2 plays r, then I should play L, since I prefer C to D. Therefore, I should play L, no
matter what Agent 2 plays.” Notice that the quoted inferences are valid in (i), but not
valid in (ii).
Suppose Agent 1 is unable to engage in contingent reasoning. That is, he knows that
playing L might lead to A or C, and playing R might lead to B or D. However, he
does not understand how, state-by-state, the outcomes after playing L are related to the
outcomes after playing R. Then it is as though he cannot distinguish (i) and (ii).
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Figure 1: ‘Similar’ mechanisms from 1’s perspective.
This idea can be made formal and general. I define an equivalence relation on the
space of mechanisms: The experience of agent i at history h records the information sets
where i was called to play, and the actions that i took, in chronological order.5 Two
mechanisms G and G′ are i-indistinguishable if there is a bijection from i’s information
sets and actions in G, onto i’s information sets and actions in G′, such that:
1. G can produce for i some experience if and only if G′ can produce for i the image
(under the bijection) of that experience.
2. An experience might result in some outcome in G if and only if its image might
result in that same outcome in G′.
With this relation, we can partition the set of all mechanisms into equivalence classes.
For instance, the mechanisms in Figure 1 are 1-indistinguishable.
Our agent knows the experiences that a mechanism might generate, and the resulting
outcomes. Thus, at any of his information sets, for any continuation strategy, he knows
all the outcomes that might result from that strategy. However, this does not nail down
every detail of the mechanism. In particular, our agent is unable to reason contingently
about hypothetical scenarios. At any information set, if Si and S
′
i prescribe different
actions, our agent is unable to make inferences of the form, “If playing Si leads to
outcome x, then playing S′i leads to outcome x
′.”
For instance, in a second-price auction, our agent knows that for each bid, he will
either win the object at a price weakly less than that bid, or not win (and pay zero).
5An experience is a standard concept in the theory of extensive games; experiences are sometimes
used to define perfect recall.
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However, he cannot make the inference, “If bidding $11 would cause me to win the object
at $8, then bidding $10 would cause me to win the object at $8.” Since the agent is unable
to make these inferences about the second-price auction, he is unable to correctly identify
his dominant strategy.
In general, what strategies can our agent recognize as weakly dominant, when he is
constrained by this coarse partition? These are all (and only) the obviously dominant
strategies. The first characterization theorem states: A strategy Si is obviously dominant
in G if and only if it is weakly dominant in every G′ that is i-indistinguishable from G.
The second characterization theorem for OSP relates to the problem of mechanism
design under partial commitment. In mechanism design, we usually assume that the
Planner can commit to every detail of a mechanism, including the events that an indi-
vidual agent does not directly observe. For instance, in a sealed-bid auction, we assume
that the Planner can commit to the function from all bid profiles to allocations and
payments, even though each agent only directly observes his own bid. Sometimes this
assumption is too strong. If agents cannot individually verify the details of a mechanism,
the Planner may be unable to commit to it.
Mechanism design under partial commitment is a pressing problem. Auctions run
by central brokers over the Internet account for billions of dollars of economic activity
(Edelman et al., 2007). In such settings, bidders may be unable to verify that the
other bidders exist, let alone what actions they have taken. As another example, some
wireless spectrum auctions use computationally demanding techniques to solve complex
assignment problems, and the auctioneer may not be permitted to publicly disclose all
the bids. In these settings, individual bidders may find it difficult and costly to verify
the output of the auctioneer’s algorithm (Milgrom and Segal, 2015).
For the second characterization theorem, I consider a ‘metagame’ where the Planner
privately communicates with agents, and eventually decides on an outcome. The Planner
chooses one agent, and sends a private message, along with a set of acceptable replies.
That agent chooses a reply, which the Planner observes. The Planner can then either
repeat this process (possibly with a different agent) or announce an outcome and end
the game.
The Planner has partial commitment power: For each agent, she can commit to use
only a subset of her available strategies. However, the subset she promises to Agent i
must be measurable with respect to i’s observations in the game. That is, if the Planner
plays a strategy not in that subset, then there exists some agent strategy profile such
that Agent i detects (with certainty) that the Planner has deviated. We call this a
bilateral commitment.
5
Suppose we require that each agent i’s strategy be optimal, for any strategies of the
other agents, and for any Planner strategy compatible with the commitment made to i.
What choice rules can be implemented in this metagame?
The second characterization theorem states: A choice rule can be supported by bilat-
eral commitments if and only if that choice rule is OSP-implementable. Consequently,
in addition to formalizing a notion of cognitive simplicity, OSP also captures the set of
choice rules that can be carried out with only bilateral commitments.
After defining and characterizing OSP, I apply this concept to several mechanism
design environments.
For the first application, I consider binary allocation problems. In this environment,
there is a set of agents N with continuous single-dimensional types θi ∈ [θi, θi]. An
allocation y is a subset of N . An allocation rule fy is a function from type profiles to
allocations. We augment this with a transfer rule ft, which specifies money transfers for
each agent. Each agent has utility equal to his type if he is in the allocation, plus his
net transfer.
ui(θi, y, t) = 1i∈yθi + ti (1)
Binary allocation problems encompass several canonical settings. They include private-
value auctions with unit demand. They include procurement auctions with unit supply;
not being in the allocation is ‘winning the contract’, and the bidder’s type is his cost of
provision. They also include binary public good problems; the feasible allocations are N
and the empty set.
Mechanism design theory has extensively investigated SP-implementation in this en-
vironment. fy is SP-implementable if and only if fy is monotone in each agent’s type
(Spence, 1974; Mirrlees, 1971; Myerson, 1981). If fy is SP-implementable, then the re-
quired transfer rule ft is essentially unique (Green and Laffont, 1977; Holmstro¨m, 1979).
What are analogues of these canonical results, if we require OSP-implementation
rather than SP-implementation? Are ascending clock auctions special, or are there other
OSP mechanisms in this environment?
I prove the following theorem: Every mechanism that OSP-implements an allocation
rule is ‘essentially’ a personal-clock auction, which is a new generalization of ascending
auctions. Moreover, this is a full characterization of OSP mechanisms: For any personal-
clock auction, there exists some allocation rule that it OSP-implements.
These results imply that when we desire OSP-implementation in a binary allocation
problem, we need not search the space of all extensive game forms. Without loss of
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generality, we can focus our attention on the class of personal-clock auctions.6
As a second application, I produce an impossibility result for a classic matching algo-
rithm: With 3 or more agents, there does not exist a mechanism that OSP-implements
Top Trading Cycles (Shapley and Scarf, 1974).
I conduct a laboratory experiment to test the theory. In the experiment, I compare
three pairs of mechanisms. In each pair, both mechanisms implement the same choice
rule. One mechanism is obviously strategy-proof. The other mechanism is strategy-
proof, but not obviously strategy-proof. Standard theory predicts that both mechanisms
result in dominant strategy play, and have identical outcomes. Instead, subjects play the
dominant strategy at significantly higher rates under the OSP mechanism, compared to
the mechanism that is just SP. This effect occurs for all three pairs of mechanisms, and
persists even after playing each mechanism five times with feedback.
The rest of the paper proceeds in the usual order. Section 2 reviews the literature.
Section 3 provides formal definitions and characterizations. Section 4 covers applications.
Section 5 reports the laboratory experiment. Section 6 concludes. Proofs omitted from
the main text are in Appendix B.
2 Related Literature
It is widely acknowledged that ascending auctions are simpler for real bidders than
second-price sealed-bid auctions (Ausubel, 2004). Laboratory experiments have inves-
tigated and corroborated this claim (Kagel et al., 1987; Kagel and Levin, 1993). More
generally, laboratory subjects find it difficult to reason state-by-state about hypothetical
scenarios (Charness and Levin, 2009; Esponda and Vespa, 2014; Ngangoue and Weiz-
sacker, 2015). This mental process, often called “contingent reasoning”, has received
little formal treatment in economic theory.7
There is also a strand of literature, including Vickrey’s seminal paper, that observes
that sealed-bid auctions raise problems of commitment (Vickrey, 1961; Cramton, 1998).
For instance, it may be difficult to prevent shill bidding without third-party verification.
Rothkopf et al. (1990) argue that “robustness in the face of cheating and of fear of
cheating is important in determining auction form”.
This paper formalizes and unifies these two strands of thought. It shows that mech-
anisms that do not require contingent reasoning are identical to mechanisms that can be
6Of course, if we do not impose the additional structure of a binary allocation problem, then there
exist OSP mechanisms that are not personal-clock auctions. This paper contains several examples.
7In subsequent work, Esponda and Vespa (2016) investigate axioms governing contingent reasoning
in single-agent decision problems.
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run under bilateral commitment.
For combinatorial auctions, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms can be strategically
complex and computationally infeasible. Consequently, there has been substantial in-
terest in designing ‘simple’ mechanisms that perform well, such as deferred-acceptance
clock auctions (Milgrom and Segal, 2015) and posted-price mechanisms (Bartal et al.,
2003; Feldman et al., 2014; Du¨tting et al., 2016). These have the (previously unmodeled)
advantage of being obviously strategy-proof.
OSP is distinct from O-solvability, a solution concept used in the computer science
literature on decentralized learning (Friedman, 2002, 2004). Strategy Si overwhelms S
′
i if
the worst possible outcome from Si is strictly better than the best possible outcome from
S′i. O-solvability calls for the iterated deletion of overwhelmed strategies. One difference
between the two concepts is that O-solvability is for normal form games, whereas OSP
invokes a notion of an ‘earliest point of departure’, which is only defined in the extensive
form. O-solvability is too strong for our current purposes, because almost no games
studied in mechanism design are O-solvable.8
There is a small literature that builds on this paper. In school choice settings, there
exist school priorities such that no mechanism OSP-implements the deferred acceptance
algorithm for those priorities (Ashlagi and Gonczarowski, 2015). Bade and Gonczarowski
(2016) characterize OSP mechanisms for house matching, and in social choice environ-
ments with single-peaked preferences. Pycia and Troyan (2016) characterize OSP mech-
anisms in general settings with no transfers and ‘rich’ preferences, and propose a stronger
solution concept (strong obvious strategy-proofness). Zhang and Levin (2017) provide
decision-theoretic foundations for obvious dominance, and propose a weaker solution
concept (equilibrium in partition dominant strategies). Li (2017) defines obvious ex post
equilibrium for settings with interdependent values.
3 Definition and Characterization
The planner operates in an environment consisting of:
1. A set of agents, N ≡ {1, . . . , n}.
2. A set of outcomes, X.
3. A set of type profiles, ΘN ≡
∏
i∈N Θi.
4. A utility function for each agent, ui : X ×Θi → R
8For instance, neither ascending clock auctions nor second-price sealed-bid auctions are O-solvable.
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A mechanism is an extensive game form with consequences in X.9 This is an extensive
game form where each terminal history z results in some outcome g(z) ∈ X. We restrict
attention to game forms with perfect recall10 and finite depth11. The full definition is
familiar to most readers, so we relegate it to Appendix A. G denotes the set of all such
game forms, with representative element G. Useful notation is compiled in Table 1.
Table 1: Notation for Extensive Game Forms
Name Notation Representative element
histories H h
precedence relation over histories ≺
immediate successors of h σ(h)
initial history h∅
terminal histories Z z
outcome resulting from z g(z)
player (agent or chance) called to play at h P (h)
information sets for agent i Ii Ii
actions available at Ii A(Ii)
most recent action at h A(h)
probability measure for chance moves δc
realization of chance moves dc
We write Ii ≺ I ′i if there exist histories h ∈ Ii and h′ ∈ I ′i such that h ≺ h′. We write
Ii ≺ h if there exists h′ ∈ Ii such that h′ ≺ h. h ≺ Ii is defined symmetrically. We use
 to denote the corresponding weak order.
A strategy Si(·) chooses an action at every information set for agent i, Si(Ii) ∈ A(Ii).
A strategy profile SN = (Si)i∈N specifies a strategy for each agent.
A type-strategy Si(·) specifies a strategy for every type of agent i, where Si(θi) denotes
the strategy assigned to type θi. A type-strategy profile SN = (Si)i∈N specifies a type-
strategy for each agent.
Let zG(h, SN , δc) be the lottery over terminal histories that results in game form
G when we start from h and play proceeds according to (SN , δc). z
G(h, SN , dc) is the
9By adopting this paradigm, we assume that the mechanism describes the entire strategic interaction
between the agents. For instance, after the mechanism has concluded, agent 1 cannot send money to
agent 2, and agent 2 cannot throw a brick through agent 1’s window. Such post-game moves often imply
that agents do not have dominant strategies, let alone obviously dominant strategies. Savage (1954)
notes that “the use of modest little worlds, tailored to particular contexts, is often a simplification, the
advantage of which is justified by a considerable body of mathematical experience with related ideas.”
10G has perfect recall if for any information set Ii, for any two histories h and h
′ in Ii, ψi(h) = ψi(h′),
where ψ(h) is the experience of agent i at history h (see Definition 8).
11That is, for each game form, there exists some number k such that no history has more than
k predecessors. This restriction is not essential to the main results, but simplifies the metagame in
Theorem 2.
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result of one realization of the chance moves under δc. We sometimes write this as
zG(h, Si, S−i, dc).
Let uGi (h, Si, S−i, dc, θi) ≡ ui(g(zG(h, Si, S−i, dc)), θi). This is the utility to agent i in
game form G, when we start at history h, play proceeds according to (Si, S−i, dc), and
the resulting outcome is evaluated according to preferences θi.
Definition 1. Given G and θi, Si is weakly dominant if: ∀S′i : ∀S−i :
Eδc [uGi (h∅, S′i, S−i, dc, θi)] ≤ Eδc [uGi (h∅, Si, S−i, dc, θi)] (2)
Let α(Si, S
′
i) be the set of earliest points of departure for Si and S
′
i. That is, α(Si, S
′
i)
contains the information sets where Si and S
′
i choose different actions, that can be on
the path of play given Si and given S
′
i.
Definition 2 (Earliest Points of Departure). Ii ∈ α(Si, S′i) if and only if:
1. Si(Ii) 6= S′i(Ii)
2. There exist S−i, dc such that Ii ≺ zG(h∅, Si, S−i, dc).
3. There exist S−i, dc such that Ii ≺ zG(h∅, S′i, S−i, dc).
This definition can be extended to deal with mixed strategies12, but pure strategies
suffice for our current purposes.
Definition 3. Given G and θi, Si is obviously dominant if: ∀S′i : ∀Ii ∈ α(Si, S′i) :
sup
h∈Ii,S−i,dc
uGi (h, S
′
i, S−i, dc, θi) ≤ inf
h∈Ii,S−i,dc
uGi (h, Si, S−i, dc, θi) (3)
In words, Si is obviously dominant if, for any deviating strategy S
′
i, conditional on
reaching any earliest point of departure, the best possible outcome under S′i is no better
than the worst possible outcome under Si.
13
Compare Definition 1 and Definition 3. Weak dominance is defined using h∅, the
history that begins the game. Consequently, if two extensive games have the same
normal form, then they have the same weakly dominant strategies. Obvious dominance
12Three modifications are necessary: First, we change requirement 1 to be that both strategies specify
different probability measures at Ii. Second, we adapt requirements 2 and 3 to hold for some realization
of the mixed strategies. Finally, we include the recursive requirement, “There does not exist I ′i ≺ Ii such
that I ′i ∈ α(Si, S′i).”
13Obvious dominance is related to conditional dominance (Shimoji and Watson, 1998); Si conditionally
dominates S′i at Ii if, for any S−i consistent with reaching Ii, the payoff under S
′
i is no better than the
payoff under Si.
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is defined with histories that are in information sets that are earliest points of departure.
Thus two extensive games with the same normal form may not have the same obviously
dominant strategies.14 Switching to a direct revelation mechanism may not preserve
obvious dominance, so the standard revelation principle does not apply.15
Weak dominance treats chance moves and other players asymmetrically. Suppose
G has a Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and we replace all the agents in N \ 1 with chance
moves drawn from the Bayes-Nash equilibrium distribution. Then agent 1 has a weakly
dominant strategy. By contrast, obvious dominance treats chance moves and other
players symmetrically.
A choice rule is a function f : ΘN → X. If we consider stochastic choice rules, then
it is a function f : ΘN → ∆X.16
A solution concept C(·) is a set-valued function; for each G, it specifies a set of
type-strategy profiles C(G), which may be an empty set.
Definition 4. (G,SN) C-implements f if:
1. SN ∈ C(G).
2. ∀θN ∈ ΘN : f(θN ) = g(zG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , δc))
G C-implements f if there exists SN that satisfies the above requirements.
f is C-implementable if there exist (G,SN) that satisfy the above requirements.
Note that our concern is with weak implementation: We require that SN ∈ C(G),
not {SN} = C(G). This is to preserve the analogy with canonical results for strategy-
proofness, many of which assume weak implementation (Myerson, 1981; Saks and Yu,
2005).
Definition 5 (Strategy-Proof). SN ∈ SP(G) if for all i and for all θi, Si(θi) is weakly
dominant.
14Two extensive games have the same reduced normal form if and only if they can be made identical
using a small set of elementary transformations (Thompson, 1952; Elmes and Reny, 1994). Which of
these transformations does not preserve obvious dominance? Elmes and Reny (1994) propose three
such transformations, INT, COA, and ADD, which preserve perfect recall. Brief inspection reveals that
obvious dominance is invariant under INT and COA, but varies under ADD.
15Glazer and Rubinstein (1996) argue that extensive games can be easier to dominance-solve than
normal-form games, because backward induction provides guidance about the correct order to delete
strategies. The standard revelation principle does not apply to their solution concept either.
16For readability, we generally suppress the latter notation, but the claims that follow hold for both
deterministic and stochastic choice rules. Additionally, the set X could itself be a set of lotteries.
The interpretation of this is that the planner can carry out one-time public lotteries at the end of the
mechanism, where the randomization is observable and verifiable.
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Definition 6 (Obviously Strategy-Proof). SN ∈ OSP(G) if for all i and for all θi,
Si(θi) is obviously dominant.
A mechanism is weakly group-strategy-proof if there does not exist a coalition that
could deviate and all be strictly better off ex post.
Definition 7 (Weakly Group-Strategy-Proof). SN ∈WGSP(G) if there does not exist
a coalition Nˆ ⊆ N , type profile θN , deviating strategies SˆNˆ , non-coalition strategies SN\Nˆ
and chance moves dc such that: For all i ∈ Nˆ :
uGi (h∅, SˆNˆ , SN\Nˆ , dc, θi) > u
G
i (h∅,SNˆ (θNˆ ), SN\Nˆ , dc, θi) (4)
Obvious strategy-proofness implies weak group-strategy-proofness.17
Proposition 1. If SN ∈ OSP(G), then SN ∈WGSP(G).
Proof. Suppose SN /∈WGSP(G). Then there is a coalition Nˆ with types θˆNˆ that could
jointly deviate to strategies SˆNˆ and all be strictly better off. Fix SN\Nˆ and dc such that
all agents in the coalition are strictly better off. Along the resulting terminal history,
there is a first agent i in the coalition to deviate from Si(θi) to Sˆi. That first deviation
happens at some information set Ii ∈ α(Si(θi), Sˆi). Agent i strictly gains from that
deviation, so SN /∈ OSP(G).18
Corollary 1. If SN ∈ OSP(G), then SN ∈ SP(G).
Proposition 1 suggests a question: Is a choice rule OSP-implementable if and only if
it is WGSP-implementable? Proposition 5 shows that this is not so.
3.1 Cognitive limitations
In what sense is obvious dominance obvious? Intuitively, to see that S′i is weakly dom-
inated by Si, the agent must understand the entire function u
G
i , and check that for all
opponent strategy profiles S−i, the payoff from S′i is no better than the payoff from Si.
By contrast, to see that S′i is obviously dominated by Si, the agent need only know the
range of the functions uGi (·, S′i, · · · ) and uGi (·, Si, · · · ) at any earliest point of departure.
Thus, obvious dominance can be recognized even if the agent has a simplified mental
model of the world. We now make this point rigorously.
17Barbera` et al. (2016) note that “many well-known individually strategy-proof mechanisms are also
group strategy-proof, even if the latter is in principle a much stronger condition than the former.”
18I thank Ilya Segal for suggesting this concise proof.
12
Definition 8. ψi(h) denotes i’s experience along history h; it is the sequence of in-
formation sets where i was called to play, and the actions that i took, in order. We
construct this by starting at h∅, and moving step-by-step through predecessors of h. At
each h′  h, if P (h′) = i, then we add the current information set to the sequence. If i
has just played an action at h′, then we add that action to the sequence.
We use Ψi to denote the set {ψi(h) | h ∈ H}∪ψ∅, where ψ∅ is the empty sequence.19
We define ψi(Ii) := ψi(h) | h ∈ Ii.
We define an equivalence relation between mechanisms. In words, G and G′ are
i-indistinguishable if there exists a bijection from i’s information sets and actions in G
onto i’s information sets and actions in G′, such that:
1. ψi is an experience in G iff ψi’s image is an experience in G
′.
2. Outcome x could follow experience ψi in G iff x could follow ψi’s image in G
′.
Definition 9. Take any G,G′ ∈ G, with information partitions Ii, I ′i and experience
sets Ψi,Ψ
′
i. G and G
′ are i-indistinguishable if there exists a bijection λG,G′ from
Ii ∪A(Ii) to I ′i ∪A′(I ′i) such that:
1. ψi ∈ Ψi iff λG,G′(ψi) ∈ Ψ′i
2. ∃z ∈ Z : g(z) = x, ψi(z) = ψi iff ∃z′ ∈ Z ′ : g′(z′) = x, ψ′i(z′) = λG,G′(ψi)
where we use λG,G′(ψi) to denote the sequence produced by passing every element of
ψi through λG,G′.
For G and G′ that are i-indistinguishable, we define λG,G′(Si) to be the strategy that,
given information set I ′i in G
′, plays λG,G′(Si(λ−1G,G′(I
′
i))).
The next theorem states that obviously dominant strategies are the strategies that
can be recognized as weakly dominant, by an agent who has this simplified mental model
of the world.
Theorem 1. For any i, θi: Si is obviously dominant in G if and only if for every G
′
that is i-indistinguishable from G, λG,G′(Si) is weakly dominant in G
′.
The “if” direction permits a constructive proof. Suppose Si is not obviously domi-
nant in G. Then there is some deviating strategy S′i and some earliest point of departure
Ii where the obvious dominance inequality does not hold. We construct a game form
19Mandating the inclusion of the empty sequence has the following consequence: By looking at the set
Ψi, it is not possible to infer whether P (h∅) = i.
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G′ that is i-indistinguishable from G, such that, for some opponent strategies, if i plays
λG,G′(Si) then play proceeds according to the worst-case scenario (consistent with reach-
ing Ii), and if i deviates at λG,G′(Ii), then play proceeds according to some best-case
scenario (consistent with reaching Ii). The key is to find a general construction that
always remains in the same equivalence class. The “only if” direction proceeds as fol-
lows: Suppose there exists some G′ in the equivalence class of G, where λG,G′(Si) is not
weakly dominant. There exists some earliest information set in G′ where i could gain by
deviating. We then use λ−1G,G′ to locate an information set in G, and a deviation S
′
i, that
do not satisfy the obvious dominance inequality. Appendix B provides the details.
One interpretation of Theorem 1 is that obviously dominant strategies are those that
can be recognized as dominant given only a partial description of the game form.
Another interpretation of Theorem 1 is that obviously dominant strategies are ro-
bust to local misunderstandings. Suppose an agent could mistake any G for any i-
indistinguishable G′. He has some belief about how his opponents are playing in G′, and
best responds to that (mistaken) belief. For instance, when faced with a second-price
auction, he could believe that he faces a third -price auction20, in which case bidding
above his value is a best response to the (symmetric) Nash equilibrium opponent strate-
gies (Kagel and Levin, 1993). When is his (true) dominant strategy still in his set of
best responses, for any such local mistake? By Theorem 1, this holds if and only if it is
obviously dominant.
Many solution concepts in behavioral game theory specify that agents understand
the game form, but best-respond to mistaken beliefs about opponent strategies.21 Since
a dominant strategy is always a best response, such theories predict no mistakes in
strategy-proof mechanisms.22 Obvious dominance captures misunderstandings about
the game form, and is thus orthogonal to these theories.
3.2 Supported by bilateral commitments
Suppose the following augmented game form G˜ with consequences in X: As before we
have a set of agents N , outcomes X, and preference profiles
∏
i∈N Θi. However, there is
one player in addition to N: Player 0, the Planner.
20In both second-price and third-price auctions, the bidder submits a sealed bid. For any sealed bid,
either he receives the object and pays a price less than or equal to his bid, or does not receive the object
and makes no payments. Thus, both mechanisms are i-indistinguishable.
21Such concepts include level-k equilibrium (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995), cognitive
hierarchy equilibrium (Camerer et al., 2004), cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Esponda,
2008), and analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel, 2005).
22With the exception of level-0 agents in level-k and cognitive hierarchy models.
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The Planner has an arbitrarily rich message space M . At the start of the game, each
agent i ∈ N privately observes θi. Play proceeds as follows:
1. The Planner chooses one agent i ∈ N and sends a query m ∈M , along with a set
of acceptable replies R ⊂M .23
2. i observes (m,R), and chooses a reply r ∈ R.
3. The Planner observes r.
4. The Planner either selects an outcome x ∈ X, or chooses to send another query.
(a) If the Planner selects an outcome, the game ends.
(b) If the Planner chooses to send another query, go to Step 1.
For i ∈ N , i’s type-strategy specifies what reply to give, as a function of his prefer-
ences, the past sequence of queries and replies between him and the Planner, and the
current (m,R). That is:
S˜i(θi, (mk, Rk, rk)
t−1
k=1,mt, Rt) ∈ Rt (5)
Analogously, a strategy S˜i depends on ((mk, Rk, rk)
t−1
k=1,mt, Rt), but not on θi. We
use S˜θii to denote the strategy played by type θi of agent i. We abbreviate (S˜
θi
i )i∈N ≡ S˜θNN .
S˜0 denotes a pure strategy for the Planner; where S0 denotes the set of all pure
strategies. We restrict the Planner to send only finitely many queries.
The standard full commitment paradigm is equivalent to allowing the Planner to
commit to a unique S˜0 ∈ S0 (or some probability measure over S0). Instead, we assume
that for each agent, the Planner can commit to a subset Sˆi0 ⊆ S0 that is measurable with
respect to that agent’s observations in the game.
This is formalized as follows: Each (S˜0, S˜N ) results in some observation oi ≡ (oCi , oXi ),
consisting of a communication sequence between the Planner and agent i, oCi = (mk, Rk, rk)
T
k=1
for T ∈ N, as well as some outcome oXi ∈ X.24 Oi is the set of all possible observations
(for agent i). We define φi : S0 × SN → Oi, where φi(S˜0, S˜N ) is the unique observation
resulting from (S˜0, S˜N ). Next we define, for any Sˆ0 ⊆ S0:
Φi(Sˆ0) ≡ {oi | ∃S˜0 ∈ Sˆ0 : ∃S˜N : oi = φi(S˜0, S˜N )} (6)
23This game could be made simpler without altering Theorem 2; the Planner could send only a set of
acceptable replies R ⊂M . Any information contained in the query could simply be ‘written into’ every
acceptable reply. However, distinguishing queries and replies makes the exposition more intuitive.
24The communication sequence might be empty, which we represent using T = 0.
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For any Oˆi ⊆ Oi:
Φ−1i (Oˆi) ≡ {S˜0 | ∀S˜N : φi(S˜0, S˜N ) ∈ Oˆi} (7)
Definition 10. Sˆ0 is i-measurable if there exists Oˆi such that:
Sˆ0 = Φ−1i (Oˆi) (8)
Intuitively, the i-measurable subsets of S0 are those such that, if the Planner deviates,
then there exists an agent strategy profile such that agent i detects the deviation; that
is, i has an observation that is not compatible with any strategy in the promised set.
Formally, the i-measurable subsets of S0 are the σ-algebra generated by Φi (where we
impose the discrete σ-algebra on Oi).25
Definition 11. A mixed strategy of finite length over Sˆ0 specifies a probability
measure over a subset S¯0 ⊆ Sˆ0 such that: There exists k ∈ N such that: For all S˜0 ∈ S¯0
and all S˜N : (S˜0, S˜N ) results in the Planner sending k or fewer total queries.
We use ∆Sˆ0 to denote the mixed strategies of finite length over Sˆ0. S˜∆0 denotes an
element of such a set.
Definition 12. A choice rule f is supported by bilateral commitments (Sˆi0)i∈N if
1. For all i ∈ N : Sˆi0 is i-measurable.
2. There exist S˜∆0 , and S˜N such that:
(a) For all θN : (S˜
∆
0 , S˜
θN
N ) results in f(θN ).
(b) S˜∆0 ∈ ∆
⋂
i∈N Sˆi0
(c) For all i ∈ N , θi, S˜′N\i,S˜∆′0 ∈ ∆Sˆi0: S˜θii is a best response to (S˜∆′0 , S˜′N\i) given
preferences θi.
Requirement 2.a is that the Planner’s mixed strategy and the agent’s pure strategies
result in the (distribution over) outcomes required by the choice rule. Requirement 2.b
is that the Planner’s strategy is a (possibly degenerate) mixture over pure strategies
25Notice that an observation for player i is simply a sequence of messages and responses, followed by
an outcome. It does not include additional information about calendar time. A consequence of this
formulation is that the Planner is unable to commit to the order in which she approaches the players.
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compatible with every bilateral commitment.26 2.c is that each agent i’s assigned strat-
egy is weakly dominant, when we consider the Planner as a player restricted to playing
mixtures over strategies in Sˆi0.
“Supported by bilateral commitments” is just one of many partial commitment
regimes. This one requires that the commitment offered to each agent is measurable
with respect to events that he can observe. In reality, contracts are seldom enforceable
unless each party can observe breaches. Thus, “supported by bilateral commitments” is
a natural case to study.
Theorem 2. f is OSP-implementable if and only if there exist bilateral commitments
(Sˆi0)i∈N that support f .
The intuition behind the proof is as follows: A bilateral commitment Sˆi0 is essentially
equivalent to the Planner committing to ‘run’ only games in some i-indistinguishable
equivalence class of G. Consequently, we can find a set of bilateral commitments that
support fy if and only if we can find some (G,SN ) such that, for every i, for every θi,
for every G′ that is i-indistinguishable from G, λG,G′(Si(θi)) is weakly dominant in G′.
By Theorem 1, this holds if and only if fy is OSP-implementable. Appendix B provides
the details.
3.3 The pruning principle
When seeking SP-implementation, we can without loss of generality restrict attention
to the class of direct revelation mechanisms, by the revelation principle. The standard
revelation principle does not hold for OSP mechanisms. As the second-price auction
illustrates, there exist OSP-implementable choice rules that cannot be implemented via
a direct revelation mechanism.
However, there is a weaker principle that substantially simplifies the analysis. Here
we define the pruning of a mechanism with respect to a type-strategy profile. If, for all
type profiles, a history is never reached, then we delete that history (and redefine the
other parts of the tuple so that what remains is well-formed).
Definition 13 (Pruning). Take any G = 〈H,≺, A,A, P, δc, (Ii)i∈N , g〉, and SN . P(G,SN ) ≡
〈H˜, ≺˜, A˜, A˜, P˜ , δ˜c, (I˜i)i∈N , g˜〉 is the pruning of G with respect to SN , constructed as fol-
lows:
1. H˜ = {h ∈ H | ∃θN : ∃dc : h  zG(h∅, (Si(θi))i∈N , dc)}
26This requirement prevents the Planner from extracting arbitrary information by making promises
and breaking them. Otherwise, the Planner could promise to implement some constant outcome, ask
every agent to report their type, and then do whatever she pleased with that information.
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2. For all i, if Ii ∈ Ii then (Ii ∩ H˜) ∈ I˜i.27
3. (≺˜, A˜, A˜, P˜ , δ˜c, g˜) are (≺, A,A, P, δc, g) restricted to H˜.
It turns out that, if some mechanism OSP-implements a choice rule, then the pruning
of that mechanism with respect to the equilibrium strategies OSP-implements that same
choice rule. Thus, while we cannot restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms, we
can restrict attention to ‘minimal’ mechanisms, such that no histories are off the path
of play. This is used both in this paper and in the subsequent literature28 to state clean
results.
Proposition 2 (The Pruning Principle). Let G˜ ≡ P(G,SN ), and S˜N be SN restricted
to G˜. If (G,SN ) OSP-implements f , then (G˜, S˜N ) OSP-implements f .
4 Applications
4.1 Binary Allocation Problems
We now consider a canonical environment, (N,X,ΘN , (ui)i∈N ). Let Y ⊆ 2N be the set
of feasible allocations, with representative element y ∈ Y . An outcome consists of an
allocation y ∈ Y and a transfer for each agent, X = Y ×Rn. t ≡ (ti)i∈N denotes a profile
of transfers.
Preferences are quasilinear. ΘN =
∏
i∈N Θi, where Θi = [θi, θi], for 0 ≤ θi < θi <∞.
For θi ∈ Θi,
ui(θi, y, t) = 1i∈yθi + ti (9)
For instance, in a private value auction with unit demand, i ∈ y if and only if agent
i receives at least one unit of the good under allocation y. In a procurement auction,
i ∈ y if and only if i does not incur costs of provision under allocation y. θi is agent i’s
cost of provision (equivalently, benefit of non-provision). In a binary public goods game,
Y = {∅, N}.
An allocation rule is a function fy : Θ → Y . A choice rule is thus a combination of
an allocation rule and a payment rule, f = (fy, ft), where ft : Θ → Rn. Similarly, for
each game form G, we disaggregate the outcome function, g = (gy, gt). In this part, we
concern ourselves only with deterministic allocation rules and payment rules, and thus
suppress notation involving δc and dc.
27Note that the initial history h∅ is distinct from the empty set. That is to say, (Ii ∩ H˜) = ∅ does not
entail that {h∅} ∈ I˜i.
28Ashlagi and Gonczarowski (2015); Bade and Gonczarowski (2016); Pycia and Troyan (2016).
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Definition 14. An allocation rule fy is C-implementable if there exists ft such that
(fy, ft) is C-implementable. G C-implements fy if there exists ft such that G C-implements
(fy, ft)
In a binary allocation problem, fy is SP-implementable if and only if fy is monotone.
29
This result is implicit in Spence (1974) and Mirrlees (1971), and is proved explicitly in
Myerson (1981).30 Moreover, if an allocation rule fy is SP-implementable, then the
accompanying transfer rule ft is essentially unique.
ft,i(θi, θ−i) = −1i∈fy(θ) inf{θ′i | i ∈ fy(θ′i, θ−i)}+ ri(θ−i) (10)
where ri is some arbitrary function of the other agents’ preferences. This follows
easily by arguments similar to those in Green and Laffont (1977) and Holmstro¨m (1979).
In this standard environment, what happens when we require OSP-implementation?
In particular, what restrictions does OSP-implementation place on the transfer rules and
the extensive game form?
In binary allocation problems, every OSP mechanism is essentially a personal-clock
auction. It is personal in two respects: Firstly, the clock price and closing rule could vary
across agents. Secondly, the clock price could be associated with different consequences
for different agents. The full statement of the definition is novel, but we will build it out
of familiar parts.
Consider how the ascending auction appears to a single bidder: At each point, there
is a ‘going transfer’ associated with being in the allocation (winning the object). The
agent either plays quit or continue; if he plays quit, then he is out of the allocation and
makes no payments. If he plays continue, then either he is in the allocation and has the
going transfer, or the going transfer falls (the going price rises) and he faces the same
decision again.
We can generalize this procedure a bit, while still ensuring that the agent has an
obviously dominant strategy. The going transfer could fall in any increments, and how
much it falls could depend on other agents’ actions. The transfer associated with being
out of the allocation could be non-zero, as long as it is some (known) fixed amount. Even
if the agent chooses continue, we could sometimes mandate that he quits, in which case
he is out of the allocation (and receives the fixed transfer). The agent need not choose
29fy is monotone if for all i, for all θ−i, 1i∈fy(θi,θ−i) is weakly increasing in θi.
30These monotonicity results for are for weak SP-implementation rather than full SP-implementation
implementation. Weak SP-implementation requires SN ∈ SP(G). Full SP-implementation requires
SN = SP(G). There are monotone allocation rules for which the latter requirement cannot be satisfied.
For example, suppose two agents with unit demand. Agent 1 receives one unit iff v1 > .5. Agent 2
receives one unit iff v2 > v1.
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between continue and quit at every information set; he need only be offered a choice when
the going transfer strictly falls. There could be multiple actions that quit, all having the
same consequence for him.31 There could be multiple actions that continue, provided
that the going transfer will not fall in future and at least one such action guarantees that
he is in the allocation. The agent could receive arbitrary information about the history
of play. We call this generalized procedure In-Transfer Falls.
Consider how a descending-price procurement auction appears to a single supplier
(holding one unit of an indivisible good): At each point, there is a ‘going transfer’
associated with being out of the allocation. The agent either plays quit or continue; if
he plays quit, then he is in the allocation (keeps the good) and receives nothing. If he
plays continue, then either he is out of the allocation (sells the good) and receives the
going transfer, or the going transfer falls and he faces the same decision again. Notice
that now the transfer associated with being in the allocation is fixed and the transfer
associated with being out of the allocation falls monotonically. We could generalize this
in the same ways as before, and call the resulting procedure Out-Transfer Falls.
In a personal-clock auction, starting from any point an agent first has a non-singleton
information set, that agent either faces In-Transfer Falls or Out-Transfer Falls.
Definition 15. G is a personal-clock auction if, for every i ∈ N , at every earliest
information set I∗i such that |A(I∗i )| > 1:
1. Either (In-Transfer Falls): There exists a fixed transfer t¯i ∈ R, a going transfer
t˜i : {Ii | I∗i  Ii} → R, and a set of ‘quitting’ actions Aq such that:
(a) For all z where I∗i ≺ z:
i. Either: i /∈ gy(z) and gt,i(z) = t¯i.
ii. Or: i ∈ gy(z) and
gt,i(z) = inf
Ii:I∗i Ii≺z
t˜i(Ii) (11)
(b) For all a ∈ Aq, for all z such that a ∈ ψi(z): i /∈ gy(z)
(c) Aq ∩A(I∗i ) 6= ∅.
(d) For all I ′i, I
′′
i ∈ {Ii | I∗i  Ii}:
i. If I ′i ≺ I ′′i , then t˜i(I ′i) ≥ t˜i(I ′′i ).
ii. If I ′i ≺ I ′′i , t˜i(I ′i) > t˜i(I ′′i ), and there does not exist I ′′′i such that I ′i ≺
I ′′′i ≺ I ′′i , then Aq ∩A(I ′′i ) 6= ∅.
31Although they could affect what happens to other agents - it is incentive compatible for the agent
to reveal any information about his type at the point when he quits, and the allocation rule could in
principle depend on this information.
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iii. If I ′i ≺ I ′′i and t˜i(I ′i) > t˜i(I ′′i ), then |A(I ′i) \Aq| = 1.
iv. If |A(I ′i) \ Aq| > 1, then there exists a ∈ A(I ′i) such that: For all z such
that a ∈ ψi(z): i ∈ gy(z).
2. Or (Out-Transfer Falls): As above, but we substitute every instance of “i ∈
gy(z)” with “i /∈ gy(z)” and vice versa.
Notice what this definition does not require. The going transfer need not be equal
across agents. Whether and how much one agent’s going transfer changes could depend
on other agents’ actions. Some agents could face In-Transfer Falls, and other agents
could face Out-Transfer Falls (a two-sided clock auction).32 Which procedure an agent
faces could even depend on other agents’ past actions.
Theorem 3. If (G,SN ) OSP-implements fy, then P(G,SN ) is a personal-clock auction.
If G is a personal-clock auction, then there exist SN and fy such that (G,SN ) OSP-
implements fy.
For any normal-form mechanism, there are typically many equivalent extensive forms.
The theory of mechanism design seldom provides general criteria to choose between them.
In binary allocation problems, obvious dominance pins down many extensive-form details
of the ascending auction, and provides an answer to the question, “Why are ascending
auctions so common?”
4.2 Top Trading Cycles
We now produce an impossibility result in a classic matching environment (Shapley and
Scarf, 1974). There are n agents in the market, each endowed with an indivisible good.
An agent’s type is a vector θi ∈ Rn. ΘN is the set of all n by n matrices of real numbers.
An outcome assigns one object to each agent. If agent i is assigned object k, he has
utility θki . There are no money transfers.
Given preferences θ and agents R ⊆ N , a top trading cycle is a set ∅ ⊂ R′ ⊆ R whose
members can be indexed in a cyclic order:
R′ = {i1, i2, . . . , ir = i0} (12)
such that each agent ik likes ik+1’s good at least as much as any other good in R.
Following Roth (1982), we assume that the algorithm in question has an arbitrary, fixed
way of resolving ties.
32Loertscher and Marx (2017) investigate two-sided clock auctions that are prior-free, asymptotically
optimal, and obviously strategy-proof.
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Definition 16. f is a top trading cycle rule if, for all θ, f(θ) is equal to the output of
the following algorithm:
1. Set R1 := N
2. For l = 1, 2, , . . .:
(a) Choose some top trading cycle R′ ⊆ Rl.
(b) Carry out the indicated trades.
(c) Set Rl+1 := Rl \R′.
(d) Terminate if Rl+1 = ∅.
The above algorithm is of economic interest, because it finds a core allocation in an
economy with indivisible goods (Shapley and Scarf, 1974).
Proposition 3. If f is a top trading cycle rule, then there exists G that SP-implements
f . (Roth, 1982)
Proposition 4. If f is a top trading cycle rule, then there exists G that WGSP-
implements f . (Bird, 1984)
Proposition 5. If f is a top trading cycle rule and n ≥ 3, then there does not exist G
that OSP-implements f .
Proof. OSP-implementability is a hereditary property of functions. That is, if f is OSP-
implementable given domain ΘN , then the subfunction f
′ = f with domain Θ′N ⊆ ΘN is
OSP-implementable. Thus, to prove Proposition 5, it suffices to produce a subfunction
that is not OSP-implementable.
Consider the following subset Θ′N ⊂ ΘN . Take agents a, b, c, with endowed goods
A,B,C. a has only two possible types, θa and θ
′
a, such that
Either B a C a A a . . .
or C a B a A a . . .
(13)
We make the symmetric assumption for b and c.
We now argue by contradiction. Take any G pruned with respect to the truthful
strategy profiles, such that (by Proposition 2) G OSP-implements f ′ = f for domain Θ′.
Consider some history h at which P (h) = a with a non-singleton action set. This cannot
come before all such histories for b and c.
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Suppose not, and suppose B a C. If a chooses the action corresponding to B a C,
and faces opponent strategies corresponding to C b A and B c A, then a receives
good A. If a chooses the action corresponding to C a B, and faces opponent strategies
corresponding A c B, then a receives good C. Thus, it is not an obviously dominant
strategy to choose the action corresponding to B a C. So a cannot be the first to have
a non-singleton action set.
By symmetry, this argument applies to b and c as well. So all of the action sets for
a, b, and c are singletons, and G does not OSP-implement f ′, a contradiction.
Proposition 5 implies that the OSP-implementable choice rules are not identical to
the WGSP-implementable choice rules.
5 Laboratory Experiment
Are obviously strategy-proof mechanisms easier for real people to understand? The
following laboratory experiment provides a straightforward test: We compare pairs of
mechanisms that implement the same choice rule. One mechanism in each pair is SP,
but not OSP. The other mechanism is OSP. Standard game theory predicts that both
mechanisms will produce the same outcome. We are interested in whether subjects play
the dominant strategy at higher rates under OSP mechanisms.
5.1 Experiment Design
The experiment is an across-subjects design, comparing three pairs of games. There are
four players in each game.
For the first pair, we compare the second-price auction (2P) and the ascending clock
auction (AC). In both these games, subjects bid for a money prize. Subjects have
induced affiliated private values; if a subject wins the prize, he earns an amount equal
to the value of the prize, minus his payments from the auction. For each subject, his
value for the prize is equal to a group draw plus a private adjustment. The group draw
is uniformly distributed between $10 and $110. The private adjustment is uniformly
distributed between $0 and $20. All money amounts in these games are in 25-cent
increments. Each subject knows his own value, but not the group draw or the private
adjustment.33
33I use affiliated private values for two reasons. First, in strategy-proof auctions with independent
private values, incentives for truthful bidding are weak for bidders with values near the extremes. Affil-
iation strengthens incentives for these bidders. Second, Kagel et al. (1987) use affiliated private values,
and the first part of the experiment is designed to replicate their results.
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2P is SP, but not OSP. In 2P, subjects submit their bids simultaneously. The highest
bidder wins the prize, and makes a payment equal to the second-highest bid. Bids are
constrained to be between $0 and $150.34
AC is OSP. In AC, the price starts at a low value (the highest $25 increment that
is below the group draw), and counts upwards, up to a maximum of $150. Each bidder
can quit at any point.35 When only one bidder is left, that bidder wins the object at the
current price.
Previous studies comparing second-price auctions to ascending clock auctions have
small sample sizes, given that when the same subjects play a sequence of auctions, these
are plainly not independent observations. Kagel et al. (1987) compare 2 groups playing
second-price auctions to 2 groups playing ascending clock auctions. Harstad (2000)
compares 5 groups playing second-price auctions to 3 groups playing ascending clock
auctions. (The comparison is not the main goal of either experiment.) Other studies
find similar results for second-price auctions (Kagel and Levin, 1993) and for ascending
clock auctions (McCabe et al., 1990), but these do not directly compare the two formats
with the same value distribution and the same subject pool. When we compare 2P and
AC, we can see this as a high-powered replication of Kagel et al. (1987), since we now
observe 18 groups playing 2P and 18 groups playing AC.36
For the second pair, we compare the second-price plus-X auction (2P+X) and the
ascending clock plus-X auction (AC+X). Subjects’ values are drawn as before. However,
there is an additional random variable X, which is uniformly distributed between $0 and
$3. Subjects are not told the value of X until after the auction.
2P+X is SP, but not OSP. In 2P+X, subjects submit their bids simultaneously.
The highest bidder wins the prize if and only if his bid exceeds the second-highest bid
plus X. If the highest bidder wins the prize, then he makes a payment equal to the
second-highest bid plus X. Otherwise, no agent wins the prize, and no payments are
made. In this game, it is a dominant strategy to submit a bid equal to your value.
AC+X is OSP. In AC+X, the price starts at a low value (the highest $25 increment
that is below the group draw), and counts upwards. Each bidder can quit at any point.37
When only one bidder is left, the price continues to rise for another X dollars, and then
34In both 2P and AC, if there is a tie for the highest bid, then no bidder wins the object.
35During the auction, each bidder observes the number of active bidders.
36I am not aware of any previous laboratory experiment that directly compares second-price and
ascending clock auctions, holding constant the value distribution and subject pool, with more than five
groups playing each format.
37As in AC, each bidder observes the number of active bidders. However, if the number of active
bidders is 1 or 2, then the computer display informs bidders that the number of active bidders is “1 or
2”.
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freezes. If the highest bidder keeps bidding until the price freezes, then she wins the
prize at the final price. Otherwise, no agent wins the prize and no payments are made.
In this game, it is an obviously dominant strategy to keep bidding if the price is strictly
below your value, and quit otherwise.
Some subjects might find 2P or AC familiar, since such mechanisms occur in some
natural economic environments. Differences in subject behavior might be caused by dif-
ferent degrees of familiarity with the mechanism. 2P+X and AC+X are novel mech-
anisms that subjects are unlikely to find familiar. 2P+X and AC+X can be seen as
perturbations of 2P and AC; the underlying choice rule is made more complex while pre-
serving the SP-OSP distinction. Thus, comparing 2P+X and AC+X indicates whether
the distinction between SP and OSP mechanisms holds for novel and more complicated
auction formats.
In the third pair of games, subjects may receive one of four common-value money
prizes. The four prize values are drawn, uniformly at random and without replacement,
from the set {$0.00, $0.25, $0.50, $0.75, $1.00, $1.25}. Subjects observe the values of all
four prizes at the start of each game.
In a strategy-proof random serial dictatorship (SP-RSD), subjects are informed of
their priority score, which is drawn uniformly at random from the integers 1 to 10.
They then simultaneously submit ranked lists of the four prizes. Players are processed
sequentially, from the highest priority score to the lowest. Ties in priority score are
broken randomly. Each player is assigned the highest-ranked prize on his list, among the
prizes that have not yet been assigned. It is a dominant strategy to rank the prizes in
order of their money value. SP-RSD is SP, but not OSP.38
In an obviously strategy-proof random serial dictatorship (OSP-RSD), subjects are
informed of their priority score. Players take turns, from the highest priority score to
the lowest. When a player takes his turn, he is shown the prizes that have not yet been
taken, and picks one of them. It is an obviously dominant strategy to pick the available
prize with the highest money value.
SP-RSD and OSP-RSD differ from the auctions in several ways. The auctions
are private-value games of incomplete information, whereas SP-RSD and OSP-RSD
are common-value games of complete information. In the auctions, subjects face two
sources of strategic uncertainty: They are uncertain about their opponents’ valuations,
and they are uncertain about their opponents’ strategies (a function of valuations).
By contrast, in SP-RSD and OSP-RSD, subjects face no uncertainty about their
38SP-RSD is SP, but not OSP since, if a player swaps the order of the highest and second-highest
prizes, he might win the second-highest prize. If he reports his true rank-order list, he might win the
third-highest prize.
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Table 2: Mechanisms in each treatment
10 rounds 10 rounds 10 rounds
Treatment 1 AC AC+X OSP-RSD
Treatment 2 2P 2P+X SP-RSD
Treatment 3 AC AC+X SP-RSD
Treatment 4 2P 2P+X OSP-RSD
opponents’ valuations.
Unlike the auctions, SP-RSD and OSP-RSD are constant-sum games, such that
one player’s action cannot affect total player surplus. Any effect that persists in both the
auctions and the serial dictatorships is difficult to explain using social preferences, since
such theories typically make different predictions for constant-sum and non-constant-
sum games. Thus, in comparing SP-RSD and OSP-RSD, we test whether the SP-OSP
distinction has empirical support in mechanisms that are very different from auctions.
At the start of the experiment, subjects are randomly assigned into groups of four.
These groups persist throughout the experiment. Consequently, each group’s play can
be regarded as a single independent observation in the statistical analysis.
Each group either plays 10 rounds of AC, followed by 10 rounds of AC+X, or plays
10 rounds of 2P, followed by 10 rounds of 2P+X.39 At the end of each round, subjects
are shown the auction result, their own profit from this round, the winning bidder’s profit
from this round, and the bids (in order from highest to lowest). Notice that subjects
have 10 rounds of experience with a standard auction, before being presented with its
unusual +X variant. Thus, the data from +X auctions record moderately experienced
bidders grappling with a new auction format.
Next, groups are re-randomized into either 10 rounds of OSP-RSD or 10 rounds of
SP-RSD. At the end of each round, subjects see which prize they have obtained, and
whether their priority score was the highest, or second-highest, and so on.
Table 2 summarizes the design. Subjects had printed copies of the instructions, and
the experimenter read aloud the part pertaining to each 10-round segment just before
that segment began. The instructions (correctly) informed subjects that their play in
earlier segments would not affect the games in later segments. The instructions did
not mention dominant strategies or provide recommendations for how to play, so as to
prevent confounds from the experimenter demand effect. Instructions for both SP and
39If a stage game with dominant strategies is repeated finitely many times, then the resulting repeated
game typically does not have a dominant strategy. The same holds for obviously dominant strategies.
Consequently, in interpreting these results as informing us about dominant strategy play, we invoke
an implicit narrow framing assumption. The same assumption is made for other experiments in this
literature, such as Kagel et al. (1987) and Kagel and Levin (1993).
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OSP mechanisms are of similar length and similar reading levels40, and can be found in
the online appendix.
In every SP mechanism, each subject had 90 seconds to make his choice. Each subject
could revise his choice as many times as he desired during the 90 seconds, and only his
final choice would count. For OSP mechanisms, mean time to completion was 113.0
seconds in AC, 121.4 seconds in AC+X, and 40.5 seconds in OSP-RSD. However,
the rules of the OSP mechanisms imply that not every subject was actively choosing
throughout that time.
5.2 Administrative details
Subjects were paid $20 for participating, in addition to their profits or losses from every
round of the experiment. On average, subjects made $37.54, including the participation
payment. Subjects who made negative net profits received just the $20 participation
payment.
I conducted the experiment at the Ohio State University Experimental Economics
Laboratory in August 2015, using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). I recruited subjects from
the student population using an online system (Greiner, 2015). I administered 16 ses-
sions, where each session involved 1 to 3 groups. Each session lasted about 90 minutes. In
total, the data include 144 subjects in 36 groups of 4 (with 9 groups in each treatment).41
5.3 Statistical Analysis
The data include 4 different auction formats, with 180 auctions per format, for a total
of 720 auctions.42
One natural summary statistic for each auction is the difference between the second-
highest bid and the second-highest value. This is, equivalently, the difference between
that auction’s closing price, and the closing price that would have occurred if all bidders
played the dominant strategy. Figure 2a displays histograms of the second-highest bid
minus the second-highest value, for AC and 2P. Figure 2b does the same for AC+X
and 2P+X. If all agents are playing the dominant strategy in an auction, then the
histogram for that auction will be a point mass at zero.
40Both sets of instructions are approximately at a fifth-grade reading level according to the Flesch-
Kincaid readability test, which is a standard measure for how difficult a piece of text is to read (Kincaid
et al., 1975).
41In two cases, network errors caused crashes which prevented a group from continuing in the experi-
ment. I recruited new subjects to replace these groups.
42In 2 out of 720 auctions, computer errors prevented bidders from correctly entering their bids. We
omit these 2 observations, but including them has little effect on any of the results that follow.
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(a) Standard auctions (b) +X auctions
Figure 2: Histogram: 2nd-highest bid minus 2nd-highest value
There is a substantial difference between the empirical distributions for OSP and SP
mechanisms. If we choose a random auction from the data, how likely is it to have a
closing price within $2.00 of the equilibrium price? An auction is 31 percentage points
more likely to have a closing price within $2.00 of the equilibrium price under AC (OSP)
compared to 2P (SP). An auction is 28 percentage points more likely to have a closing
price within $2.00 of the equilibrium price under AC+X (OSP) compared to 2P+X
(SP). Closing prices under 2P+X are systematically biased upwards (p = .0031)43.
Table 3 displays the mean absolute difference between the second-highest bid and the
second-highest value, for the first 5 rounds and the last 5 rounds of each auction. This
measures the magnitude of errors under each mechanism. (Alternative measures of errors
are in Appendix C.) Errors are systematically larger under SP than under OSP, and this
difference is significant in both the standard auctions and the novel +X auctions, and in
both early and late rounds. To build intuition for effect sizes, consider that the expected
profit of the winning bidder in 2P and AC is about $4.00 (given dominant strategy
play). Thus, the average errors under 2P are larger than the theoretical prediction for
total bidder surplus.
There is some evidence of learning in 2P; errors are smaller in the last five rounds
compared to the first five rounds (p = .045, paired t-test). For the other three auction
formats, there is no significant evidence of learning.44
To compare subject behavior under SP-RSD and OSP-RSD, we compute the pro-
43For each group, we take the mean difference between the second-highest bid and the second-highest
value. This produces one observation per group playing 2P+X, for a total of 18 observations, and we
use a t-test for the null that these have zero mean.
44p = .173 for AC, p = .694 for 2P+X, and p = .290 for AC+X.
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Table 3: mean(abs(2nd bid - 2nd value))
Format Rounds SP OSP p-value
Auction
1-5 8.04 3.19 .006
(1.25) (1.05)
6-10 4.99 1.77 .016
(1.18) (0.33)
+X Auction
1-5 3.99 1.83 .006
(0.60) (0.41)
6-10 3.69 1.29 .017
(0.87) (0.33)
For each group, we take the mean absolute difference over each 5-round block. We then compute standard
errors counting each group’s 5-round mean as a single observation. (18 observations per cell, standard
errors in parentheses.) p-values are computed using a two-sample t-test, allowing for unequal variances.
Other empirical strategies yield similar results; see Appendix C for details.
Table 4: Proportion of serial dictatorships not ending in dominant strategy outcome
SP OSP p-value
Rounds 1-5 43.3% 7.8% .0002
(7.3%) (3.3%)
Rounds 6-10 28.9% 6.7% .0011
(5.2%) (3.2%)
p-value .1026 .7492
For each group, for each 5-round block, we record the error rate. We then compute standard errors
counting each group’s observed error rate as a single observation. (18 observations per cell, standard
errors in parentheses.) When comparing SP to OSP, we compute p-values using a two-sample t-test,
allowing for unequal variances. (Alternative empirical strategies yield similar results. See Appendix C
for details.) When comparing early to late rounds of the same game, we compute p-values using a paired
t-test.
portion of games that do not end in the dominant strategy outcome. Under SP-RSD,
36% of games do not end in the dominant strategy outcome. Under OSP-RSD, 7%
of games do not end in the dominant strategy outcome. Table 4 displays the empirical
frequency of non-dominant strategy outcomes, by format and by 5-round blocks. De-
viations from the dominant strategy outcome happen more frequently under SP-RSD
than under OSP-RSD, and these differences are highly significant in both early and
late rounds.
In SP-RSD, 29% of submitted rank-order lists contain errors. The most common
error under SP-RSD is to swap the ranks of the highest and second-highest prizes,
and report the list in order 2nd-1st-3rd-4th. This error accounts for 18% of incorrect
rank-order lists.
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5.4 One-Shot Treatments
At the suggestion of a referee, I ran additional treatments that investigate SP-RSD
and OSP-RSD without repeated play and with higher stakes, at the same laboratory
as the original treatments. These treatments consist of a one-shot serial dictatorship,
followed by a demographic questionnaire. The stakes are twelve times as high; four
money prizes are drawn uniformly at random and without replacement from the set
{$0, $3, $6, $9, $12, $15}.
I administered 24 sessions, 12 in each treatment, in February 2017. In total, the
data include 404 subjects in 101 groups, 48 in one-shot SP-RSD and 53 in one-shot
OSP-RSD.45
Under one-shot SP-RSD, 40% of games do not end in the dominant strategy out-
come, compared to 8% under one-shot OSP-RSD. This difference is statistically signifi-
cant (p = .0001, Fisher’s exact test). For comparison, the corresponding error rates in the
first round of the ten-round treatments are 44% for SP-RSD and 17% for OSP-RSD.
Error rates in the one-shot treatments are not significantly different from first-round
error rates in the ten-round treatments.46 In one-shot SP-RSD, subjects who submit
incorrect lists lose $2.30 on average, compared to the amount they would have earned
by playing the dominant strategy.47
5.5 Summary of Experiment
In summary, subjects play the dominant strategy at higher rates in OSP mechanisms, as
compared to SP mechanisms that should (according to standard theory) implement the
same choice rule. This difference is significant and substantial across all three pairs of
mechanisms, and persists after five rounds of repeated play with feedback. Of course, the
set of all strategy-proof mechanisms cannot be tested exhaustively in a single experiment.
This is only preliminary evidence that obvious dominance correctly classifies strategy-
proof mechanisms according to their cognitive complexity.
There are not (yet) well-formed alternative theories that explain the data presented
here. The following theories predict dominant-strategy play in any strategy-proof mecha-
45The imbalance between treatments is due to subjects who registered to participate, but were absent
at the time their session started. Each session lasted about 10 minutes, and subjects were paid $5 for
participating, in addition to their incentive payments.
46p = .802 for SP-RSD and p = .176 for OSP-RSD, Fisher’s exact test. Zhang and Levin (2017)
investigate a similar strategy-proof serial dictatorship, and find that 37% of games do not end in the
dominant-strategy outcome.
47In one-shot SP-RSD, 33% of subjects submit incorrect rank-order lists. The most common error is
still to report the order 2nd-1st-3rd-4th, which accounts for 30% of incorrect lists. Demographic analysis
is in Appendix C.
30
nism: Level-k equilibrium48, cognitive hierarchy equilibrium49, cursed equilibrium50, and
analogy-based expectation equilibrium51. Standard specifications of quantal response
equilibrium52 predict substantial under-bidding in ascending auctions, and simulations
suggest that it predicts larger errors in ascending auctions than in second-price auctions,
which is the opposite of the effect in the data (Appendix D provides details).
6 Discussion
Sometimes, it is important to design simple mechanisms. If simple auctions attract more
participants, then they can raise more revenue than complex optimal auctions (Bulow
and Klemperer, 1996). Moreover, human beings tend to play their equilibrium strategies
in simple mechanisms, but make large mistakes in complex mechanisms.53 This affects
the performance of complex optimal mechanisms, often in ways that are difficult to
foresee. Simplicity can be a real constraint - every bit as real as the constraints imposed
by technology or incentives.54
Consequently, we need a precise definition of simplicity. Of course, mechanisms can
be simple or complex in many ways, and the definition I have provided captures only one
of them. Any definition must trade off multiple worthy concerns. It must be empirically
accurate, but analytically tractable. It must be weak enough to allow positive results,
but strong enough to discipline our choice of mechanisms.
Here are some dimensions of simplicity that OSP does not capture, which might
be fruitful for investigation: Firstly, since OSP invokes only standard game-theoretic
primitives, it does not capture framing effects. Any multiple-choice mathematics quiz
has an obviously dominant strategy, since there is a deterministic correct answer for
every question. We can embed puzzles of arbitrary complexity into the labels of moves,
which OSP entirely neglects. Secondly, OSP abstracts from the complexity of searching
a deep game tree for the optimal strategy. The agent compares his obviously dominant
strategy to deviations at each information set, but how does he find that strategy in the
first place? In a well-engineered mechanism, the answer may be that the designer draws
the agent’s attention to it.
48Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995); Nagel (1995).
49Camerer et al. (2004).
50Eyster and Rabin (2005); Esponda (2008).
51Jehiel (2005).
52McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1998)
53Such behavior has been found in the laboratory (Kagel et al., 1987; Kagel and Levin, 1993; Chen
and So¨nmez, 2006; Zhang and Levin, 2017), and in high-stakes decisions in the field (Hassidim et al.,
2016; Rees-Jones, 2017).
54This paraphrases an observation that Roth (2007) makes about repugnance.
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A formal definition lets us quantify the cost of simplicity. For instance, it is complex
to sell multiple objects in a combinatorial auction, because the welfare-optimal mecha-
nism must elicit preferences over the power set of objects. In such environments, it can
be that no OSP mechanism yields first-best welfare.55 However, when objects are sub-
stitutes and types are independently distributed, there always exists an OSP mechanism
that delivers at least half of first-best expected welfare (Feldman et al., 2014; Du¨tting
et al., 2016).56 In these environments, the ‘cost of simplicity’ is bounded by a half.
When designing mechanisms, the appropriate constraints depend on the intended
application. (The requirement that a ship withstand thirty atmospheres of pressure
is superfluous for many vessels, but vital for submarines.) If the agents are expert
strategists, and the mechanism will be thoroughly audited by a trusted third-party, then
OSP is too demanding. Strategically sophisticated agents and full commitment power
are the ideal conditions for mechanism design. These conditions do not always obtain,
so it is valuable to design mechanisms that are robust to weaker assumptions.
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A Definition of Extensive Game Forms with Consequences
in X
An extensive game form with consequences in X is a tuple 〈H,≺, A,A, P, δc, (Ii)i∈N , g〉,
where:
1. H is a set of histories, along with a binary relation ≺ on H that represents prece-
dence.
(a) ≺ is a partial order, and (H,≺) form an arborescence57.
57That is, a directed rooted tree such that every edge points away from the root.
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(b) h∅ denotes h ∈ H : ¬∃h′ : h′ ≺ h
(c) H has finite depth, i.e.:
∃k ∈ N : ∀h ∈ H : |{h′ ∈ H : h′ ≺ h}| ≤ k (14)
(d) Z ≡ {h ∈ H : ¬∃h′ : h ≺ h′}
(e) σ(h) denotes the set of immediate successors of h.
2. A is a set of actions.
3. A : H \ h∅ → A labels each non-initial history with the last action taken to reach
it.
(a) For all h, A is one-to-one on σ(h).
(b) A(h) denotes the actions available at h.
A(h) ≡
⋃
h′∈σ(h)
A(h′) (15)
4. P is a player function. P : H \ Z → N ∪ c, where c is chance.
5. δc is the chance function. It specifies a probability measure over chance moves.
dc denotes some realization of chance moves: For any h where P (h) = c, dc(h) ∈
A(h).58
6. Ii is a partition of {h : P (h) = i} such that:
(a) A(h) = A(h′) whenever h and h′ are in the same cell of the partition.
(b) For any Ii ∈ Ii, we denote: P (Ii) ≡ P (h) for any h ∈ Ii. A(Ii) ≡ A(h) for
any h ∈ Ii.
(c) Each action is available at only one information set: If a ∈ A(Ii), a′ ∈ A(I ′j),
Ii 6= I ′j then a 6= a′.
7. g is an outcome function. It associates each terminal history with an outcome.
g : Z → X
58We could make the addition assumption that δc has full support on the available moves A(h) when
it is called to play. This ensures a pleasing invariance property: It rules out games with zero-probability
chance moves that do not affect play, but do affect whether a strategy is obviously dominant. However,
a full support assumption is not necessary for any of the results that follow, so we do not make it here.
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B Proofs omitted from the main text (for online publica-
tion)
B.1 Theorem 1
Proof. First we prove the “if” direction. Fix agent 1 and preferences θ1. Suppose that S1
is not obviously dominant in G = 〈H,≺, A,A, P, δc, (Ii)i∈N , g〉. We need to demonstrate
that there exists G˜ that is i-indistinguishable from G, such that λG,G˜(S1) is not weakly
dominant in G˜ . We proceed by construction.
Let (S′1, I1, hsup, S
sup
−1 , d
sup
c , hinf , Sinf−1, dinfc ) be such that I1 ∈ α(S1, S′1), hinf ∈ I1,
hsup ∈ I1, and
uG1 (h
sup, S′1, S
sup
−1 , d
sup
c , θ1) > u
G
1 (h
inf , S1, S
inf
−1, d
inf
c , θ1) (16)
SinceG is a game of perfect recall, we can pick (Sinf−1, dinfc ) such that hinf ≺ zG(h∅, S1, Sinf−1, dinfc ),
by specifying that (Sinf−1, dinfc ) plays in a way consistent with hinf at any h ≺ hinf . Likewise
for hsup and (Ssup−1 , d
sup
c ). Suppose we have so done.
We now define another game G˜ is 1-indistinguishable from G. Intuitively, we con-
struct this as follows:
1. We add a chance move at the start of the game; chance can play L or R.
2. Agent 1 does not at any history know whether chance played L or R.
3. If chance plays L, then the game proceeds as in G.
4. If chance plays R, then the game proceeds mechanically as though all players in
N \ 1 and chance played according to Ssup−1 , dsupc in G, with one exception:
5. If chance played R, we reach the information set corresponding to I1, and agent 1
plays S1(I1), then the game henceforth proceeds mechanically as though all players
in N \ 1 and chance played according to Sinf−1, dinfc in G.
Formally, the construction proceeds as such: A˜ = A∪ {L,R}, where A∩ {L,R} = ∅.
There is a new starting history h˜∅, with two successors σ(h˜∅) = {h˜L, h˜R}, A˜(h˜L) = L,
A˜(h˜R) = R, P˜ (h˜∅) = c. The subtree H˜L ⊂ H˜ starting from h˜L ordered by ≺˜ is the same
as the arborescence (H,≺). (A˜, P˜ , δ˜c, g˜) are defined on H˜L exactly as (A, P, δc, g) are on
H. For j 6= 1, I˜j is defined as on H.
We now construct the subtree starting from h˜R. Let h
∗ be such that h∗ ∈ σ(hsup),
h∗  zG(hsup, S1, Ssup−1 , dsupc ).
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H ′ ≡ {h ∈ H | ∃S′′1 : h  zG(h∅, S′′1 , Ssup−1 , dsupc )}}
∩[{h ∈ H | P (h) = 1} ∪ {h ∈ Z}]
\{h ∈ H | h∗  h}
(17)
In words, these are the histories that can be reached by some S′′1 when facing
Ssup−1 , d
sup
c , where either agent 1 is called to play or that history is terminal, and such
that those histories are not h∗ or its successors.
Let h∗∗ be such that h∗∗ ∈ σ(hinf), h∗∗  zG(hinf , S1, Sinf−1, dinfc ).
H ′′ ≡ {h ∈ H | ∃S′′1 : h  zG(h∅, S′′1 , Sinf−1, dinfc )}
∩[{h ∈ H | P (h) = 1} ∪ {h ∈ Z}]
∩{h ∈ H | h∗∗  h}
(18)
In words, these are the histories that can be reached by some S′′1 when facing Sinf−1, dinfc ,
where either agent 1 is called to play or that history is terminal, and such that those
histories are h∗∗ or its successors.
We now paste these together. Let H˜R be the rooted subtree ordered by ≺˜, for some
bijection γ : H˜R → H ′ ∪H ′′, such that for all h˜, h˜′ ∈ H˜R, h˜≺˜h˜′ if and only if
1. EITHER: γ(h˜), γ(h˜′) ∈ H ′ and γ(h˜) ≺ γ(h˜′)
2. OR: γ(h˜), γ(h˜′) ∈ H ′′ and γ(h˜) ≺ γ(h˜′)
3. OR: γ(h˜) ≺ h∗ and h∗∗  γ(h˜′)
The root of this subtree exists and is unique; it corresponds to γ−1(h), where h is
the earliest history preceding zG(h∅, S1, S
sup
−1 , d
sup
c )} where 1 is called to play. Let h˜R be
the root of H˜R. This completes the specification of H˜.
For all h˜ ∈ H˜R, we define:
1. g˜(h˜) = g(γ(h˜)) if h˜ is a terminal history.
2. P˜ (h˜) = 1 if h˜ is not a terminal history.
For all h˜ ∈ H˜R \ h˜R, we define A˜(h˜) = A(h), for the unique (h˜′, h) such that:
1. h˜ ∈ σ(h˜′)
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2. h ∈ σ(γ(h˜′))
3. h  γ(h˜)
We now specify the information sets for agent 1. Every h˜ ∈ H˜L corresponds to a
unique history in H. We use γL to denote the bijection from H˜L to H. Let γˆ be defined
as γL on H˜L and γ on H˜R.
1’s information partition I˜1 is defined as such: ∀h˜, h˜′ ∈ H˜ :
∃I˜ ′1 ∈ I˜1 : h˜, h˜′ ∈ I˜ ′1 (19)
if and only if
∃I ′1 ∈ I1 : γˆ(h˜), γˆ(h˜′) ∈ I˜ ′1 (20)
All that remains is to define δc; we need only specify that at h˜∅, c plays R with
certainty.59
G˜ = 〈H˜, ≺˜, A˜, A˜, P˜ , δ˜c, (I˜i)i∈N , g˜〉 is 1-indistinguishable from G. Every experience at
some history in H˜L corresponds to some experience in G, and vice versa. Moreover, any
experience at some history in H˜R could also be produced by some history in H˜L.
Let λG,G˜ be the appropriate bijection from 1’s information sets and actions in G
onto 1’s information sets and actions in G˜. Take arbitrary S˜−1. Observe that since
I1 ∈ α(S1, S′1), λG,G˜(S1) and λG,G˜(S′1) result in the same histories following h˜R, until they
reach information set λG,G˜(I1). Having reached that point, λG,G˜(S1) leads to outcome
g(zG(hinf , S1, S
inf−1, dinfc )) and λG,G˜(S
′
1) leads to outcome g(z
G(hsup, S′1, S
sup
−1 , d
sup
c )). Thus,
Eδ˜c [u
G˜
1 (h˜∅, λG,G˜(S
′
1), S˜−1, d˜c, θ1)]
= uG1 (h
sup, S′1, S
sup
−1 , d
sup
c , θ1)
> uG1 (h
inf , S1, S
inf
−1, d
inf
c , θ1)
= Eδ˜c [u
G˜
1 (h˜∅, λG,G˜(S1), S˜−1, d˜c, θ1)]
(21)
So λG,G˜(S1) is not weakly dominant in G˜.
We now prove the “only if” direction. Take arbitrary G˜. Suppose λG,G˜(S1) ≡ S˜1 is
not weakly dominant in G˜ (given type θ1). We want to show that S1 is not obviously
dominant in G.
59If one prefers to avoid δc without full support, an alternative proof puts  probability on L, for 
close to 0, or for games with |N | > 2 assigns P˜ (h˜∅) = 2.
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There exist S˜′1 and S˜′−1 such that:
Eδ˜c [u
G˜
1 (h˜∅, S˜
′
1, S˜
′
−1, d˜c, θ1)] > Eδ˜c [u
G˜
1 (h˜∅, S˜1, S˜
′
−1, d˜c, θ1)] (22)
This inequality must hold for some realization of the chance function, so there exists
d˜c such that:
uG˜1 (h˜∅, S˜
′
1, S˜
′
−1, d˜c, θ1) > u
G˜
1 (h˜∅, S˜1, S˜
′
−1, d˜c, θ1) (23)
Fix (S˜′1, S˜′−1, d˜c, θ1).
zG˜(h˜∅, S˜′1, S˜
′
−1, d˜c) 6= zG˜(h˜∅, S˜1, S˜′−1, d˜c) (24)
Define:
H˜∗ ≡ {h˜ ∈ H˜ | h˜ ≺ zG˜(h˜∅, S˜′1, S˜′−1, d˜c) and h˜ ≺ zG˜(h˜∅, S˜1, S˜′−1, d˜c)} (25)
h˜∗ ≡ h˜ ∈ H˜∗ such that ∀h˜′ ∈ H˜∗ : h˜′  h˜ (26)
Since the opponent strategies and chance moves are held constant across both sides
of Equation 24, P (h˜∗) = 1 and h˜∗ ∈ I˜1, where S˜1(I˜1) 6= S˜′1(I˜1). Moreover, I˜1 ∈ α(S˜1, S˜′1)
and λG˜,G(I˜1) ∈ α(S1, S′1), where we denote S′1 ≡ λG˜,G(S˜′1).
SinceG and G˜ are 1-indistinguishable, consider the experiences λG˜,G(ψ1(z
G˜(h˜∅, S˜1, S˜′−1, d˜c)))
and λG˜,G(ψ1(z
G˜(h˜∅, S˜′1, S˜′−1, d˜c))).
In G, λG˜,G(ψ1(z
G˜(h˜∅, S˜1, S˜′−1, d˜c))) could lead to outcome g˜(zG˜(h˜∅, S˜1, S˜′−1, d˜c)). We
use (Sinf−1, dinfc ) to denote the corresponding opponent strategies and chance realizations
that lead to that outcome. We denote hinf ≡ h ∈ λG˜,G(I˜1) : h ≺ zG(h∅, S1, Sinf−1, dinfc ) .
In G, λG˜,G(ψ1(z
G˜(h˜∅, S˜′1, S˜′−1, d˜c))) could lead to outcome g˜(zG˜(h˜∅, S˜′1, S˜′−1, d˜c)). We
use (Ssup−1 , d
sup
c ) to denote the corresponding opponent strategies and chance realizations
that lead to that outcome. We denote hsup ≡ h ∈ λG˜,G(I˜1) : h ≺ zG(h∅, S′1, Ssup−1 , dsupc ) .
uG1 (h
sup, S′1, S
sup
−1 , d
sup
c , θ1)
= uG˜1 (h˜∅, S˜
′
1, S˜
′
−1, d˜c, θ1)
> uG˜1 (h˜∅, S˜1, S˜
′
−1, d˜c, θ1)
= uG1 (h
inf , S1, S
inf
−1, d
inf
c , θ1)
(27)
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where hsup, hinf ∈ λG˜,G(I˜1) and λG˜,G(I˜1) ∈ α(S1, S′1). Thus S1 is not obviously
dominant in G.
B.2 Theorem 2
Proof. The key is to see that, for every G ∈ G, there is a corresponding S˜∆0 , and vice
versa. We use S¯0 to denote the support of S˜∆0 . In particular, observe the following
isomorphism:
Table 5: Equivalence between extensive game forms and Planner mixed strategies
G S˜∆0
dc S˜0 ∈ S¯0
δc the probability measure specified by S˜
∆
0
g(z) for z ∈ Z the Planner’s choice of outcome when she ends the game
Ii ((mk, Rk, rk)
t−1
k=1,mt, Rt) consistent with some S˜0 ∈ S¯0
A(Ii) Rt
ψi(z) o
c
i consistent with some S˜0 ∈ S¯0 and S˜N
Information sets inG are equivalent to sequences of past communication ((mk, Rk, rk)
t−1
k=1,mt, Rt)
under S˜∆0 . Available actions at some information set A(Ii) are equivalent to acceptable
responses Rt. Thus, for any strategy in some game G, we can construct an equivalent
strategy given appropriate S˜∆0 , and vice versa.
Furthermore, fixing a chance realization dc and agent strategies SN uniquely results in
some outcome. Similarly, fixing a realization of the planner’s mixed strategy S˜0 ∈ S¯0 and
agent strategies S˜N uniquely determines some outcome. Consequently, for any G ∈ G,
there exists S˜∆0 with the same strategies available for each agent and the same resulting
(probability measure over) outcomes, and vice versa.60 Table 5 summarizes.
The next step is to see that a bilateral commitment Sˆi0 is equivalent to the Planner
promising to ‘run’ only games in some equivalence class that is i-indistinguishable.
Suppose that there is some G that OSP-implements f . Pick some equivalent S˜∆0 with
support S¯0. For each i ∈ N , specify the bilateral commitment Sˆi0 ≡ Φ−1i (Φi(S¯0)). These
bilateral commitments support f .
To see this, take any S˜∆′0 ∈ ∆Sˆi0, with support S¯′0. For any S˜′0 ∈ S¯′0, for any S˜′N , there
exists S˜0 ∈ S¯0 and S˜N such that φi(S˜′0, S˜′N ) = φi(S˜0, S˜N ). By construction, G is such
that: There exists z ∈ Z where ψi(z) and g(z) are equivalent to φi(S˜0, S˜N ). Thus, for
60Implicitly, this relies on the requirement that both G and S˜∆0 have finite length. If one had finite
length but the other could be infinitely long, the resulting outcome would not be well defined and the
equivalence would not hold.
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G′ that is equivalent to S˜∆′0 , every terminal history in G′ results in the same experience
for i and the same outcome as some terminal history in G. Consequently, G and G′ are
i-indistinguishable. Thus, by Theorem 1, the strategy assigned to agent i with type θi
is weakly dominant in G′, which implies that it is a best response to S˜∆′0 and any S˜N\i
in the bilateral commitment game. Thus, if f is OSP-implementable, then f can be
supported by bilateral commitments.
Suppose that f can be supported by bilateral commitments (Sˆi0)i∈N , with requisite
S˜∆0 (with support S¯0) and S˜N . Without loss of generality, let us suppose these are
‘minimal’ bilateral commitments, i.e. Sˆi0 = Φ
−1
i (Φi(S¯0)). Pick G that is equivalent to
S˜∆0 . G OSP-implements f .
To see this, consider any G′ such that G and G′ are i-indistinguishable. Let S˜∆′0
denote the Planner strategy that corresponds to G′. At any terminal history z′ in G′,
the resulting experience ψi(z
′) and outcome g′(z′) are equivalent to the experience ψi(z)
and outcome g(z) for some terminal history z in G. These in turn correspond to some
observation oi ∈ Φi(S¯0). Thus S˜∆′0 ∈ ∆Sˆi0. Since f is supported by (Sˆj0)j∈N , S˜θii is a
best response (for type θi) to S˜
∆′
0 and any S˜N\i. Thus, the equivalent strategy Si(θi)
is weakly dominant in G′. Since this argument holds for all i-indistinguishable G′, by
Theorem 1, Si(θi) is obviously dominant in G. Thus, if f can be supported by bilateral
commitments, then f is OSP-implementable.
B.3 Proposition 2
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose (G˜, S˜N ) does not OSP-implement f . Then
there exists some (i, θi, S˜
′
i, I˜i) such that I˜i ∈ α(S˜i(θi), S˜′i) and
uG˜i (h˜, S˜i(θi), S˜−i, d˜c, θi, ) < u
G˜
i (h˜
′, S˜′i, S˜
′
−i, d˜
′
c, θi, ) (28)
for some (h˜, S˜−i, d˜c) and (h˜′, S˜′−i, d˜
′
c).
Notice that h˜ and h˜′ correspond to histories h and h′ in G. Moreover, we can define
S′i = S˜
′
i at information sets containing histories that are shared by G and G˜, and specify
S′i arbitrarily elsewhere. We do the same for (S˜−i, d˜c) and (S˜
′
−i, d˜
′
c), to construct (S−i, dc)
and (S−i, dc). But, starting from h and h′ respectively, these result in the same outcomes
as their partners in G˜. Thus,
uGi (h,Si(θi), S−i, dc, θi, ) < u
G
i (h
′, S′i, S
′
−i, d
′
c, θi, ) (29)
h, h′ ∈ Ii, for Ii ∈ α(Si(θi), S′i). Thus (G,SN ) does not OSP-implement f .
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B.4 Theorem 3
We split this proof into two parts.
Proposition 6. If (G,SN ) OSP-implements fy, then P(G,SN ) is a personal-clock auc-
tion.
Proof. Throughout this proof, we use the following notation: Given some type-strategy
Si, S
θi
i denotes the strategy assigned to θi by Si.
Take any (G,SN ) that implements (fy, ft). For any history h, we define
Θh ≡ {θN | h  zG(h∅, (Sθii )i∈N} (30)
Θh,i ≡ {θi | ∃θ−i : (θi, θ−i) ∈ Θh} (31)
For information set Ii, we define
ΘIi ≡ ∪h∈IiΘh (32)
ΘIi,i ≡ {θi | ∃θ−i : (θi, θ−i) ∈ ΘIi} (33)
Θ1Ii,i ≡ {θi | ∃θ−i : (θi, θ−i) ∈ ΘIi and i ∈ fy(θi, θ−i)} (34)
Θ0Ii,i ≡ {θi | ∃θ−i : (θi, θ−i) ∈ ΘIi and i /∈ fy(θi, θ−i)} (35)
Some observations about this construction:
1. Since player i’s type-strategy depends only on his own type, ΘIi,i = Θh,i for all
h ∈ Ii.
2. ΘIi,i = Θ
1
Ii,i
∪Θ0Ii,i
3. Since SP requires 1i∈fy(θ) weakly increasing in θi, Θ
1
Ii,i
dominates Θ0Ii,i in the strong
set order.
Lemma 1. Suppose (G,SN ) OSP-implements (fy, ft), where G ≡ 〈H,≺, A,A, P, δc, (Ii)i∈N , g〉.
For all i, for all Ii ∈ Ii, if:
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1. θi < θ
′
i
2. θi ∈ Θ1Ii,i
3. θ′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i
then Sθii (Ii) = S
θ′i
i (Ii).
Equivalently, for any Ii, there exists a
∗
Ii
such that for all θi ∈ Θ1Ii,i ∩Θ0Ii,i, Sθii (Ii) =
a∗Ii.
Suppose not. Take (i, Ii, θi, θ
′
i) constituting a counterexample to Lemma 1. Since
θi ∈ Θ1Ii,i, there exists h ∈ Ii and S−i such that i ∈ gy(zG(h, Sθii , S−i)). Fix ti ≡
gt,i(z
G(h, Sθii , S−i)). Since θ
′
i ∈ Θ0Ii,i, there exists h′ ∈ Ii and S′−i such that i /∈
gy(z
G(h′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
′
−i)). Fix t
′
i ≡ gt,i(zG(h′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
′
−i)). Since S
θi
i (Ii) 6= S
θ′i
i (Ii) and θi ∪ θ′i ⊆
ΘIi,i, Ii ∈ α(Sθii , S
θ′i
i ). Thus, OSP requires that
ui(θi, h, S
θi
i , S−i) ≥ ui(θi, h′, S
θ′i
i , S
′
−i) (36)
which implies
θi + ti ≥ t′i (37)
and
ui(θ
′
i, h, S
θi
i , S−i) ≤ ui(θ′i, h′, S
θ′i
i , S
′
−i) (38)
which implies
θ′i + ti ≤ t′i (39)
But θ′i > θi, so
θ′i + ti > t
′
i (40)
a contradiction. This proves Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. Suppose (G,SN ) OSP-implements (fy, ft) and P(G,SN ) = G. Take any Ii
such that Θ1Ii,i ∩Θ0Ii,i 6= ∅, and associated a∗Ii.
1. If there exists θi ∈ Θ0Ii,i such that Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii, then there exists t0i such that:
(a) For all θi ∈ Θ0Ii,i such that Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii, for all h ∈ Ii, for all S−i, gt,i(zG(h, Sθii , S−i)) =
t0i .
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(b) For all θi ∈ ΘIi,i such that Sθii (Ii) = a∗Ii, for all h ∈ Ii, for all S−i, if
i /∈ gy(zG(h, Sθii , S−i)), then gt,i(zG(h, Sθii , S−i)) = t0i .
2. If there exists θi ∈ Θ1Ii,i such that Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii, then there exists t1i such that:
(a) For all θi ∈ Θ1Ii,i such that Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii, for all h ∈ Ii, for all S−i, gt,i(zG(h, Sθii , S−i)) =
t1i .
(b) For all θi ∈ ΘIi,i such that Sθii (Ii) = a∗Ii, for all h ∈ Ii, for all S−i, if
i ∈ gy(zG(h, Sθii , S−i)), then gt,i(zG(h, Sθii , S−i)) = t1i .
Take any type θ′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i such that S
θ′i
i (Ii) 6= a∗Ii . Take any type θ′′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i such that
S
θ′′i
i (Ii) = a
∗
Ii
. (By Θ1Ii,i ∩ Θ0Ii,i 6= ∅ there exists at least one such type.) Notice that
Ii ∈ α(Sθ
′
i
i , S
θ′′i
i ).
By Lemma 1, θ′i /∈ Θ1Ii,i, and the game is pruned. Thus,
∀h ∈ Ii : ∀S−i : i /∈ gy(zG(h, Sθ
′
i
i , S−i)) (41)
Since θ′′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i,
∃h ∈ Ii : ∃S−i : i /∈ gy(zG(h, Sθ
′′
i
i , S−i)) (42)
OSP requires that type θ′i does not want to (inf-sup) deviate. Thus,
inf
h∈Ii,S−i
gt,i(z
G(h, S
θ′i
i , S−i)) ≥
sup
h∈Ii,S−i
{gt,i(zG(h, Sθ
′′
i
i , S−i)) : i /∈ gy(zG(h, S
θ′′i
i , S−i))}
(43)
OSP also requires that type θ′′i does not want to (inf-sup) deviate. This implies
inf
h∈Ii,S−i
{gt,i(zG(h, Sθ
′′
i
i , S−i)) : i /∈ gy(zG(h, S
θ′′i
i , S−i))}
≥ sup
h∈Ii,S−i
gt,i(z
G(h, S
θ′i
i , S−i))
(44)
The RHS of Equation 43 is weakly greater than the LHS of Equation 44. The RHS of
Equation 44 is weakly greater than the LHS of Equation 43. Consequently all four terms
are equal. Moreover, this argument applies to every θ′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i such that S
θ′i
i (Ii) 6= a∗Ii ,
and every θ′′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i such that S
θ′′i
i (Ii) = a
∗
Ii
. Since the game is pruned, θ′′i satisfies
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(1b) iff θ′′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i and S
θ′′i
i (Ii) = a
∗
Ii
. This proves part 1 of Lemma 2. Part 2 follows
by symmetry; we omit the details since they involve only small changes to the above
argument.
Lemma 3. Suppose (G,SN ) OSP-implements (fy, ft) and P(G,SN ) = G. Take any Ii
such that Θ1Ii,i ∩Θ0Ii,i 6= ∅, and associated a∗Ii. Let t1i and t0i be defined as before.
1. If there exists θi ∈ Θ0Ii,i such that Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii, then for all (h ∈ Ii, Si, S−i), if
i ∈ gy(zG(h, Si S−i)), then gt,i(zG(h, Si, S−i)) ≤ t0i − sup{θi ∈ Θ0Ii,i : Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii}.
2. If there exists θi ∈ Θ1Ii,i such that Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii, then for all (h ∈ Ii, Si, S−i), if
i /∈ gy(zG(h, Si S−i)), then gt,i(zG(h, Si, S−i)) ≤ inf{θi ∈ Θ1Ii,i : Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii}+ t1i .
Suppose that part 1 of Lemma 3 does not hold. Fix (h ∈ Ii, Si, S−i) such that
i ∈ gy(zG(h, Si S−i)) and gt,i(zG(h, Si, S−i)) > t0i − sup{θi ∈ Θ0Ii,i : Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii}. Since
G is pruned, we can find some θ′i ∈ ΘIi,i such that for every I˜i ∈ {I ′i ∈ Ii : Ii ∈ ψ(I ′i)},
S
θ′i
i (I˜i) = Si(I˜i). Fix that θ
′
i.
Fix θ′′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i such that Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii and θ′′i ≥ sup{θi ∈ Θ0Ii,i : Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii} − .
Since G is pruned and θ′′i /∈ Θ1Ii,i (by Lemma 1), it must be that S
θ′′i
i (Ii) 6= S
θ′i
i (Ii).
By construction, Ii ∈ α(Sθ
′
i
i , S
θ′′i
i ).
OSP requires that, for all h′′ ∈ Ii, S′′−i:
ui(θ
′′
i , h
′′, Sθ
′′
i
i , S
′′
−i) ≥ ui(θ′′i , h, Sθ
′
i
i , S−i) (45)
which entails
t0i ≥ θ′′i + gt,i(zG(h, Si, S−i)) (46)
which entails
t0i − sup{θi ∈ Θ0Ii,i : Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii}+  ≥ gt,i(zG(h, Si, S−i)) (47)
But, by hypothesis,
t0i − sup{θi ∈ Θ0Ii,i : Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii} < gt,i(zG(h, Si, S−i)) (48)
Since this argument holds for all  > 0, we can pick  small enough to create a
contradiction. This proves part 1 of Lemma 3. Part 2 follows by symmetry.
Lemma 4. Suppose (G,SN ) OSP-implements (fy, ft) and P(G,SN ) = G. Take any Ii
such that |Θ1Ii,i ∩Θ0Ii,i| > 1 and associated a∗Ii.
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1. If there exists θi ∈ Θ0Ii,i such that Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii, then for all θ′i ∈ Θ1Ii,i, S
θ′i
i (Ii) = a
∗
Ii
.
2. (Equivalently) If there exists θi ∈ Θ1Ii,i such that Sθii (Ii) 6= a∗Ii, then for all θ′i ∈
Θ0Ii,i, S
θ′i
i (Ii) = a
∗
Ii
.
Suppose Part 1 of Lemma 4 does not hold. Fix Ii, and choose θ
′
i < θ
′′
i such that
{θ′i} ∪ {θ′′i } ⊆ Θ1Ii,i ∩ Θ0Ii,i. Fix θ′′′i ∈ Θ1Ii,i such that S
θ′′′i
i (Ii) 6= a∗Ii . By Lemma 1, if
θ′′′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i, then S
θ′′′i
i (Ii) = a
∗
Ii
, a contradiction. Thus, θ′′′i ∈ Θ1Ii,i \Θ0Ii,i, and since Θ1Ii,i
dominates Θ0Ii,i in the strong set order, θ
′′
i < θ
′′′
i .
Since θ′i ∈ Θ1Ii,i, there exists h′ ∈ Ii and θ′−i such that (θ′i, θ′−i) ∈ ΘIi and i ∈
gy(z
G(h′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
θ′−i
−i )). By Lemma 2, there exists ai ∈ Ai(Ii) such that ai 6= a∗Ii and
choosing ai ensures i /∈ y and ti = t0i . Thus, by G SP
θ′i + gt,i(z
G(h′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
θ′−i
−i )) ≥ t0i (49)
By θ′′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i, there exists h′′ ∈ Ii and θ′′−i such that i /∈ gy(zG(h′′, S
θ′′i
i , S
θ′′−i
−i )). By
Lemma 2
gt,i(z
G(h′′, Sθ
′′
i
i , S
θ′′−i
−i )) = t
0
i (50)
ByG SP, i ∈ gy(zG(h′, Sθ
′′′
i
i , S
θ′−i
−i )) and gt,i(z
G(h′, Sθ
′′′
i
i , S
θ′−i
−i )) = gt,i(z
G(h′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
θ′−i
−i )).
Notice that Ii ∈ α(Sθ
′′
i
i , S
θ′′′i
i ). Thus, OSP requires that θ
′′
i does not want to (inf-sup)
deviate to θ′′′i ’s strategy, which entails:
gt,i(z
G(h′′, Sθ
′′
i
i , S
θ′′−i
−i )) ≥ θ′′i + gt,i(zG(h′, S
θ′′′i
i , S
θ′−i
−i )) (51)
t0i ≥ θ′′i + gt,i(zG(h′, Sθ
′′′
i
i , S
θ′−i
−i ))
> θ′i + gt,i(z
G(h′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
θ′−i
−i ))
(52)
which contradicts Equation 49.
Part 2 is the contrapositive of Part 1. This proves Lemma 4.
Lemma 5. Suppose (G,SN ) OSP-implements (fy, ft) and P(G,SN ) = G.
For all Ii, if |Θ1Ii,i ∩Θ0Ii,i| ≤ 1 and |A(Ii)| ≥ 2, then there exists t1i and t0i such that:
1. For all θi ∈ ΘIi,i, h ∈ Ii, S−i:
(a) If i /∈ gy(zG(h, Sθii , S−i)) then gt,i(zG(h, Sθii , S−i)) = t0i
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(b) If i ∈ gy(zG(h, Sθii , S−i)) then gt,i(zG(h, Sθii , S−i)) = t1i
2. If |Θ1Ii,i| > 0 and |Θ0Ii,i| > 0, then t1i = − inf{θi ∈ Θ1Ii,i}+ t0i
By G pruned, ΘIi,i 6= ∅.
Consider the case where Θ1Ii,i = ∅. Pick some θ′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i and some h′ ∈ Ii, S′−i.
Fix t0i ≡ gt,i(zG(h′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
′
−i)). Suppose there exists some (θ
′′
i , θ
′′
−i) ∈ ΘIi such that
ft,i(θ
′′
i , θ
′′
−i) = t
0
i
′′ 6= t0i . Pick h′′ ∈ Ii such that h′′  zG(∅, Sθ
′′
i
i , S
θ′′−i
−i ). By Equation 10,
for all θi ∈ ΘIi,i, ft,i(θi, θ′′−i) = t0i ′′. By G pruned and |A(Ii)| ≥ 2, we can pick θ′′′i ∈ Θ0Ii,i
such that S
θ′′′i
i (Ii) 6= S
θ′i
i (Ii). Notice that Ii ∈ α(S
θ′′′i
i , S
θ′i
i ). If t
0
i
′′
> t0i , then
ui(θ
′
i, h
′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
′
−i) = t
0
i < t
0
i
′′
= ui(θ
′
i, h
′′, Sθ
′′′
i
i , S
θ′′−i
−i ) (53)
so S
θ′i
i is not obviously dominant for (i, θ
′
i). If t
0
i
′′
< t0i , then
ui(θ
′′′
i , h
′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
′
−i) = t
0
i > t
0
i
′′
= ui(θ
′′′
i , h
′′, Sθ
′′′
i
i , S
θ′′−i
−i ) (54)
so S
θ′′′i
i is not obviously dominant for (i, θ
′′′
i ). By contradiction, this proves Lemma 5
for this case. A symmetric argument proves Lemma 5 for the case where Θ0Ii,i = ∅.
Note that, if Lemma 5 holds at some information set Ii, it holds at all information
sets I ′i that follow Ii. Thus, we need only consider some earliest information set I
∗
i at
which |Θ1I∗i ,i ∩Θ
0
I∗i ,i
| ≤ 1 and |A(I∗i )| ≥ 2.
Now we consider the case where Θ1I∗i ,i
6= ∅ and Θ0I∗i ,i 6= ∅.
At every prior information set Ii prior to I
∗
i , |Θ1Ii,i ∩ Θ0Ii,i| > 1. Since Θ1I∗i ,i 6= ∅
and Θ0I∗i ,i
6= ∅, by Lemma 4, I∗i is reached by some interval of types all taking the same
action. Thus sup{θi ∈ Θ0I∗i ,i} = inf{θi ∈ Θ
1
I∗i ,i
}.
Fix θˆi ∈ Θ0I∗i ,i such that θˆi ≥ sup{θi ∈ Θ
0
I∗i ,i
} − . Choose corresponding hˆ ∈ I∗i and
θˆ−i ∈ ΘI∗i ,−i such that i /∈ gy(zG(hˆ, S θˆii , S
θˆ−i
−i )). Define t
0
i ≡ gt,i(zG(hˆ, S θˆii , S θˆ−i−i )).
Fix θˇi ∈ Θ1I∗i ,i such that θˇi ≤ inf{θi ∈ Θ
1
I∗i ,i
} + . Choose corresponding hˇ ∈ I∗i and
θˇ−i ∈ ΘI∗i ,−i such that i ∈ gy(zG(hˇ, S θˇii , S
θˇ−i
−i )). Define t
1
i ≡ gt,i(zG(hˇ, S θˇii , S θˇ−i−i )).
Suppose there exists some (θ′i, θ
′
−i) ∈ ΘI∗i such that i /∈ fy(θ′i, θ′−i) and ft,i(θ′i, θ′−i) =
t0i
′ 6= t0i . Since sup{θi ∈ Θ0I∗i ,i} = inf{θi ∈ Θ
1
I∗i ,i
}, it follows that for all θ−i ∈
ΘI∗i ,−i, inf{θi : i ∈ fy(θi, θ−i)} = inf{θi ∈ Θ1I∗i ,i}. Thus, by Equation 10, for all
θi ∈ ΘI∗i ,i: ft,i(θi, θ′−i) = −1i∈fy(θi,θ′−i) inf{θi ∈ Θ1I∗i ,i} + t
0
i
′
. Fix h′ ∈ I∗i such that
h′  zG(∅, Sθ′ii , S
θ′−i
−i ).
By A(Ii) ≥ 2, we can pick some θ′′i ∈ ΘI∗i ,i such that S
θ′′i
i (Ii) 6= S θˆii (Ii). Notice that
I∗i ∈ α(Sθ
′′
i
i , S
θˆi
i ). Either θ
′′
i ∈ Θ0I∗i or θ
′′
i ∈ Θ1I∗i \Θ
0
I∗i
. Suppose θ′′i ∈ Θ0I∗i . Suppose t
0
i
′
> t0i .
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By OSP,
ui(θˆi, hˆ, S
θˆi
i , S
θˆ−i
−i ) ≥ ui(θˆi, h′, S
θ′′i
i , S
θ′−i
−i ) (55)
which entails
t0i ≥ t0i ′ + 1i∈fy(θ′′i ,θ′−i)(θˆi − inf{θi ∈ Θ1I∗i ,i})
≥ t0i ′ + 1i∈fy(θ′′i ,θ′−i)(−)
≥ t0i ′ − 
(56)
and we can pick  small enough to constitute a contradiction. Suppose t0i
′
< t0i . By
OSP
ui(θ
′′
i , hˆ, S
θˆi
i , S
θˆ−i
−i ) ≤ ui(θ′′i , h′, S
θ′′i
i , S
θ′−i
−i ) (57)
which entails
t0i ≤ t0i ′ + 1i∈fy(θ′′i ,θ′−i)(θ′′i − inf{θi ∈ Θ1I∗i ,i})
= t0i
′
+ 1i∈fy(θ′′i ,θ′−i)(θ
′′
i − sup{θi ∈ Θ0I∗i ,i}) ≤ t
0
i
′ (58)
which is a contradiction.
The case that remains is θ′′i ∈ Θ1I∗i \ Θ
0
I∗i
. Then i ∈ fy(θ′′i , θ′−i) and ft,i(θ′′i , θ′−i) =
− inf{θi ∈ Θ1I∗i ,i}+ t
0
i
′
. Suppose t0i
′
> t0i . OSP requires:
ui(θˆi, hˆ, S
θˆi
i , S
θˆ−i
−i ) ≥ ui(θˆi, h′, S
θ′′i
i , S
θ′−i
−i ) (59)
which entails
t0i ≥ θˆi − inf{θi ∈ Θ1I∗i ,i}+ t
0
i
′
≥ t0i ′ − 
(60)
and we can pick  small enough to constitute a contradiction.
Suppose t0i
′
< t0i . Since S
θ′′i
i (Ii) 6= S θˆii (Ii), either S θˇii (Ii) 6= S θˆii (Ii) or S θˇii (Ii) 6=
S
θ′′i
i (Ii). Moreover, ft,i(θˇi, θ
′
i) = −1i∈fy(θˇi,θ′−i) inf{θi ∈ Θ
1
I∗i ,i
}+ t0i ′.
Suppose S θˇii (Ii) 6= S θˆii (Ii). OSP requires:
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ui(θˇi, h
′, S θˇii , S
θ′−i
−i ) ≥ ui(θˇi, hˆ, S θˆii , S θˆ−i−i ) (61)
which entails
1i∈fy(θˇi,θ′−i)(θˇi − inf{θi ∈ Θ
1
I∗i ,i
}) + t0i ′ ≥ t0i (62)
which entails
1i∈fy(θˇi,θ′−i)+ t
0
i
′ ≥ t0i (63)
and we can pick  small enough to yield a contradiction. Suppose S θˇii (Ii) 6= S
θ′′i
i (Ii).
By Equation 10, ft,i(θˇi, θ
′
−i) = −1i∈fy(θˇi,θ′−i) inf{θi ∈ Θ
1
I∗i ,i
} + t0i ′, and ft,i(θ′′i , θˆ−i) =
− inf{θi ∈ Θ1I∗i ,i}+ t
0
i . OSP requires
ui(θˇi, h
′, S θˇii , S
θ′−i
−i ) ≥ ui(θˇi, hˆ, S
θ′′i
i , S
θˆ−i
−i ) (64)
which entails
1i∈fy(θˇi,θ′−i)(θˇi − inf{θi ∈ Θ
1
I∗i ,i
}) + t0i ′ ≥ (θˇi − inf{θi ∈ Θ1I∗i ,i}) + t
0
i (65)
which entails
1i∈fy(θˇi,θ′−i)+ t
0
i
′ ≥ + t0i (66)
which entails
t0i
′ ≥ t0i (67)
a contradiction. By the above argument, for all Ii satisfying the assumptions of
Lemma 5, there is a unique transfer t0i for all terminal histories z passing through Ii such
that i /∈ gy(z). Equation 10 thus implies that there is a unique transfer t1i for all terminal
histories z passing through Ii such that i ∈ gy(z). Moreover, t1i = − inf{θi ∈ Θ1Ii,i}+ t0i .
This proves Lemma 5.
Now to bring this all together. We leave showing parts (1.d.iv) and (2.d.iv) of
Definition 15 to the last. Take any (Gˆ, SˆN ) that OSP-implements (fy, ft). Define
G ≡ P(Gˆ, SˆN ) and SN as SˆN restricted toG. By Proposition 2, (G,SN ) OSP-implements
(fy, ft).
We now characterize (G,SN ). For any player i, consider any information set I
∗
i such
that |A(I∗i )| ≥ 2, and for all prior information sets I ′i ≺ I∗i , |A(I ′i)| = 1. By Lemma 1,
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there is a unique action a∗I∗i taken by all types in Θ
1
I∗i ,i
∩Θ0I∗i ,i.
Either |Θ1I∗i ,i ∩Θ
0
I∗i ,i
| > 1 or |Θ1I∗i ,i ∩Θ
0
I∗i ,i
| ≤ 1.
If |Θ1I∗i ,i ∩Θ
0
I∗i ,i
| > 1, then by Lemma 4, G˜ pruned and |A(Ii)| ≥ 2,
1. EITHER: There exists θi ∈ Θ0I∗i ,i such that S
θi
i (I
∗
i ) 6= a∗I∗i , and for all θ
′
i ∈ Θ1I∗i ,i,
S
θ′i
i (I
∗
i ) = a
∗
I∗i
.
2. OR: There exists θi ∈ Θ1I∗i ,i such that S
θi
i (I
∗
i ) 6= a∗I∗i , and for all θ
′
i ∈ Θ0I∗i ,i, S
θ′i
i (I
∗
i ) =
a∗I∗i .
In the first case, then by Lemma 2, there is some t¯i such that, for all (Si, S−i), for
all h ∈ Ii, if i /∈ gy(zG(h, Si, S−i), then gt,i(zG(h, Si, S−i) = t¯i. Moreover, we can define
a ‘going transfer’ at all information sets I ′i such that I
∗
i  I ′i:
t˜i(I
′
i) ≡ min
I′′i :I
∗
i I′′i I′i
[t¯i − sup{θi ∈ Θ0I′′i ,i : S
θi
i (I
′′
i ) 6= a∗I′′i }] (68)
Notice that this function falls monotonically as we move along the game tree; for any
I ′i, I
′′
i such that I
′
i  I ′′i , t˜i(I ′i) ≥ t˜i(I ′′i ). Moreover, by construction, at any I ′i, I ′′i such
that I ′i ≺ I ′′i , t˜i(I ′i) > t˜i(I ′′i ), and there does not exist I ′′′i such that I ′i ≺ I ′′′i ≺ I ′′i , then
there exists a ∈ A(I ′′i ) that yields i /∈ y, and by Lemma 2 this yields transfer t¯i. We
define Aq to include all such quitting actions; i.e. Aq is the set of all actions such that:
1. a ∈ Ii for some Ii ∈ Ii
2. For all z such that a ∈ ψi(z): i /∈ gy(z) and gt,i(z) = t¯i
Lemma 3 and SP together imply that, at any terminal history z, if i ∈ gy(z), then
gt,i(z) = inf
Ii:I∗i Ii≺z
t˜i(Ii) (69)
This holds because, if gt,i(z) < infIi:I∗i Ii≺z t˜i(Ii), then type θi such that t¯i−infIi:I∗i Ii≺z t˜i(Ii)) <
θi < t¯i − gt,i(z) could profitably deviate to play a ∈ A0 at information set I∗i .
In the second case, then by Lemma 2, there is some t¯i such that, for all (Si, S−i), for
all h ∈ I∗i , if i ∈ gy(zG(h, Si, S−i), then gt,i(zG(h, Si, S−i) = t¯i. Moreover, we can define
a ‘going transfer’ at all information sets I ′i such that I
∗
i  I ′i):
t˜i(I
′
i) ≡ min
I′′i :I
∗
i I′′i I′i
[t¯i + inf{θi ∈ Θ0I′′i ,i : S
θi
i (I
′′
i ) 6= a∗I′′i }] (70)
We define A1 symmetrically for this second case.
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Part (1.d.iii) and (and its analog in Clause 2) of Definition 15 follow from Lemma 4.
The above constructions suffice to prove Theorem 3 for cases where |Θ1I∗i ,i ∩ Θ
0
I∗i ,i
| > 1.
Cases where |Θ1I∗i ,i ∩Θ
0
I∗i ,i
| ≤ 1 are dealt with by Lemma 5.
Now for the last piece: We prove that parts (1.d.iv) and (and its analog in Clause
2) of Definition 15 hold. The proof of part (1.d.iv) is as follows: Suppose we are facing
Clause 1 of Definition 15, and for some Ii, |A(I ′i) \ A0| > 1. By part (1.d.iii), we know
that the going transfer t˜i can fall no further. Since G is pruned and |A(I ′i) \ A0| > 1,
there exist two distinct types of i, θi, θ
′
i ∈ ΘI′i,i, who do not quit at I ′i, and take different
actions. Since neither quits at I ′i and the going transfer falls no further, there exist
θ−i, θ′−i ∈ ΘI′i,−i such that i ∈ fy(θi, θ−i) and i ∈ fy(θ′i, θ′−i). So there exist (h ∈ I ′i, S−i)
and (h′ ∈ I ′i, S′−i) such that
i ∈ gy(h, Sθii , S−i) (71)
i ∈ gy(h′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
′
−i) (72)
gt,i(h, S
θi
i , S−i) = gt,i(h
′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
′
−i) = t˜i(I
′
i) (73)
WLOG suppose θi < θ
′
i. Suppose that there does not exist a ∈ A(I ′i) such that, for
all z such that a ∈ ψi(z), i ∈ gy(z). Then there must exist (h′′ ∈ I ′i, S′′−i) such that
i /∈ gy(h′′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
′′
−i) (74)
gt,i(h
′′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
′′
−i) = t¯i (75)
Note that I ′i ∈ α(Sθii , S
θ′i
i ). But then S
θ′i
i is not obviously dominant, a contradiction,
since
uG˜i (h
′′, Sθ
′
i
i , S
′′
−i, θ
′
i) = t¯i ≤ θi + t˜i(I ′i)
< θ′i + t˜i(I
′
i) = u
G˜
i (h, S
θi
i , S−i, θ
′
i)
(76)
(The first inequality holds because of type θi’s incentive constraint.) This shows that
part (1.d.iv) of Definition 15 holds. Its analog in Clause 2 is proved symmetrically.
Proposition 7. If G is a personal-clock auction, then there exist SN and fy such that
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(G,SN ) OSP-implements fy.
Proof. Take any personal-clock auction G. For any i and any θi, the following strategy
Si is obviously dominant:
1. If i encounters an information set consistent with Clause 1 of Definition 15, then,
from that point forward:
(a) If θi + t˜i(Ii) > t¯i and there exists a ∈ A(Ii) \Aq, play a ∈ A(Ii) \Aq.
i. If |A(Ii) \ Aq| > 1, then play a ∈ A(I ′i) such that: For all z such that
a ∈ ψi(z): i ∈ gy(z).
(b) Else play some a ∈ Aq.61
2. If i encounters an information set consistent with Clause 2 of Definition 15, then,
from that point forward:
(a) If θi + t¯i < t˜i(Ii) and there exists a ∈ A(Ii) \Aq, play a ∈ A(Ii) \Aq.
i. If |A(Ii) \ Aq| > 1, then play a ∈ A(I ′i) such that: For all z such that
a ∈ ψi(z): i /∈ gy(z).
(b) Else play some a ∈ Aq.
The above strategy is well-defined for any agent in any personal-clock auction, by
inspection of Definition 15.
Consider any deviating strategy S′i. At any earliest point of departure, the agent
will have encountered an information set consistent with either Clause 1 or Clause 2 of
Definition 15. Suppose that the agent has encountered an information set covered by
Clause 1.
Take some earliest point of departure Ii ∈ α(Si, S′i). Notice that, by (1.a) of Definition
15, no matter what strategy i plays, conditional on reaching Ii, either agent i is not in the
allocation and receives t¯i, or agent i is in the allocation and receives a transfer tˆi ≤ t˜i(Ii).
Suppose θi + t˜i(Ii) > t¯i. Note that under Si, conditional on reaching Ii, the agent
either is not in the allocation and receives t¯i, or is in the allocation and receives a transfer
strictly above t¯i−θi. If S′i(Ii) ∈ Aq (i.e. if agent i quits), then the best outcome under S′i
is no better than the worst outcome under Si. If S
′
i(Ii) /∈ Aq, then, since S′i(Ii) 6= Si(Ii),
|A(Ii) \ Aq| > 1. Then, by (1.d.iii) of Definition 15, t˜i will fall no further. So Si(Ii)
guarantees that i will be in the allocation and receive transfer t˜i(Ii). But, by (1.a) of
61If |Aq ∩A(Ii)| > 1, the agent chooses deterministically but arbitrarily.
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Definition 15, the best possible outcome under S′i conditional on reaching Ii is no better,
so the obvious dominance inequality holds.
Suppose θi + t˜i(Ii) ≤ t¯i. Then, under Si, conditional on reaching Ii, agent i is not in
the allocation and has transfer t¯i.
62 However, under S′i, either the outcome is the same,
or agent i is in the allocation for some transfer tˆi ≤ t˜i(Ii) ≤ t¯i − θi. Thus, the best
possible outcome under S′i is no better than the worst possible outcome under Si, and
the obvious dominance inequality holds.
The argument proceeds symmetrically for Clause 2.
Notice that the above strategies result in some allocation and some payments, as a
function of the type profile. We define these to be (fy, ft), such that G OSP-implements
(fy, ft).
C Alternative Empirical Specifications (for online publica-
tion)
Here we report alternative empirical specifications for the experiment.
A natural measure of errors would be to take the sum, for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, of the absolute
difference between the kth highest bid and the kth highest value. However we do not
observe the highest bid under AC, and we often do not observe the highest bid under
AC+X. We could instead take the sum for k = 2, 3, 4 of the absolute difference between
the kth highest bid and the kth highest value, averaged as before in five-round blocks.
Table 6 reports the results.
Another measure of errors would be to take the sum of the absolute difference between
each bidder’s bid and that bidder’s value, dropping all highest bidders for symmetry.
Table 7 reports the results.
Table 8 reports the results of Table 4, except that the p-values are calculated using
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
29.0% of rank-order lists are incorrect under SP-RSD. 2.6% of choices are incorrect
under OSP-RSD. However, this is not a fair comparison; rank-order lists mechanically
allow us to spot more errors than single choices. To compare like with like, we compute
the proportion of incorrect choices we would have observed, if subjects played OSP-RSD
as though they were implementing the submitted rank-order lists for SP-RSD. This is a
cautious measure; it counts errors under SP-RSD only if they alter the outcome. Table
62By (1.d.ii) of Definition 15, either i will have quit in the past, or will have an opportunity to quit
now, which he exercises.
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Table 6: mean(sum(abs(kth bid - kth value))), for k = 2, 3, 4
Format Rounds SP OSP p-value
Auction
1-5 32.63 9.89 < .001
(4.64) (1.89)
6-10 16.28 5.53 .001
(2.73) (0.91)
+X Auction
1-5 17.04 6.18 .011
(3.70) (1.06)
6-10 14.21 4.74 .022
(3.70) (0.75)
For each auction, we sum the absolute differences between the kth bid and the kth value, for k = 2, 3, 4.
We then take the mean of this over each 5-round block. We then compute standard errors counting each
group’s 5-round mean as a single observation. (18 observations per cell.) p-values are computed using a
two-sample t-test, allowing for unequal variances.
Table 7: mean(sum(abs(i’s bid - i’s value))), dropping highest bidders
Format Rounds SP OSP p-value
Auction
1-5 35.13 10.18 < .001
(5.20) (1.88)
6-10 15.46 4.89 .002
(2.85) (0.72)
+X Auction
1-5 17.88 5.58 .009
(4.10) (1.01)
6-10 14.20 4.64 .022
(3.72) (0.83)
For each auction, we sum the absolute differences between each bidder’s bid and their value, dropping
the highest bidder. We then take the mean of this over each 5-round block. We then compute standard
errors counting each group’s 5-round mean as a single observation. (18 observations per cell.) p-values
are computed using a two-sample t-test, allowing for unequal variances.
Table 8: Proportion of serial dictatorships not ending in dominant strategy outcome,
p-values calculated using Wilcoxon rank-sum test
SP OSP p-value
Rounds 1-5 43.3% 7.8% .0001
Rounds 6-10 28.9% 6.7% .0010
This is the same as Table 4, except that the p-values are calculated using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
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9 reports the results.
Table 9: Proportion of incorrect choices under serial dictatorship: SP (imputed) vs OSP
(actual)
SP OSP p-value
Rounds 1-5 17.8% 2.6% < .001
(3.5%) (1.1%)
Rounds 6-10 10.7% 2.6% .002
(2.0%) (1.3%)
p-value .078 1.000
For each group in SP-RSD, for each period, we simulate the three choices that we would have observed
under OSP-RSD. For each group, for each 5-round block, we record the proportion of choices that are
incorrect. We then compute standard errors counting each group-block pair as a single observation. (18
observations per cell.) When comparing SP to OSP, we compute p-values using a two-sample t-test.
When comparing early to late rounds of the same game, we compute p-values using a paired t-test. In
the sample for OSP-RSD, there are 7 incorrect choices in the first five rounds and 7 incorrect choices
in the last five rounds.
In Table 10, we compute the mean difference between the second-highest bid and the
second-highest value, by auction format and by five-round blocks. This summarizes the
average direction of deviations (positive or negative) from equilibrium play. I had no
prior hypothesis about these outcome variables, but report this analysis for completeness.
Table 11 breaks down the rate that subjects submit incorrect rank-order lists in
one-shot SP-RSD by demographic category.
Table 10: mean(2nd bid - 2nd value)
Format Rounds SP OSP
Auction
1-5 -1.59 0.58
(2.07) (0.77)
6-10 4.22∗∗∗ 0.78∗
(1.28) (0.40)
+X Auction
1-5 1.62∗∗ 0.15
(0.70) (0.47)
6-10 2.97∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.97) (0.31)
For each group, we take the mean difference between the second-highest bid and the second-highest value
over each 5-round block. We then compute standard errors counting each group’s 5-round mean as a
single observation. (18 observations per cell, standard errors in parentheses.) We then run a two-sided
t-test for the null that the value in each cell has zero mean. * denotes p < .10, ** denotes p < .05, and
*** denotes p < .01.
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Table 11: Incorrect lists in one-shot SP-RSD, by demographic categories
Yes No p-value
Economics major 46% 31% .131
STEM major 32% 34% .876
Took a course in game theory 34% 33% .876
Male 37% 28% .214
This table displays the proportion of subjects who submitted incorrect rank-order lists in one-shot SP-
RSD, by self-reported demographic categories. There are 192 subjects in this treatment. p-values are
computed with Fisher’s exact test.
D Quantal Response Equilibrium (for online publication)
Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is defined for normal form games (McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995). Agent quantal response equilibrium (AQRE) adapts QRE to extensive
form games (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998); agents play a perturbed best response at
each information set, given correct beliefs about the (perturbed) play of other agents
and their future selves.
Standard specifications of AQRE predict extreme under-bidding in ascending auc-
tions with fine bid increments. I here provide a simple proof that, for any private-value
ascending auction, there exist bid increments fine enough that logit-AQRE predicts that
all bids will be close to 0 with probability close to 1. The proof also works for a class of
related models, that allow agents to have arbitrary beliefs about the strategies of other
agents and their future selves.
Definition 17. An equilibrium with τ-logit errors specifies, for every information
set, some (arbitrary) beliefs about opponent strategies and the agent’s own continuation
strategy. Given those beliefs, let {v1, . . . , vJ} denote the implied continuation values for
actions {a1, . . . , aJ} at information set Ii. The probability that agent i chooses aj at
Ii is equal to
eτvj∑J
l=1 e
τvl
for some τ ≥ 0, where this randomization is independent across
information sets and agents.
This contains logit-AQRE (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1998) as a special case. It also
includes na¨ıve logit models, such that agents believe that their opponents and their
future selves play dominant strategies.
We now consider the following environment: There is a single object and some finite
set of bidders, with types (private values) in the interval [0, 1] and quasi-linear utility.
Types are drawn according to some joint cdf F : [0, 1]|N | → [0, 1].
Definition 18. In a k-increment ascending auction, the price rises step by step
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through the set { 0k , 1k , 2k , . . .}. Agents observe only the clock price, and whether the auction
has ended. At each price, active agents (in some arbitrary order) choose In or Out.
Agents who choose Out become inactive; they make no payments and do not receive the
object. At any point when only one agent is active, the auction ends, and the active
agent wins the object at the current clock price.
Proposition 8. For any  > 0 and any τ , there exists k such that, for all k ≥ k, in any
equilibrium with τ -logit errors of the k-increment ascending auction, the probability that
the closing price is above  is less than .
Proof. Let M k := max{j ∈ Z such that jk ≤ }; this is the index of the highest bid
increment below . Take any agent i, any type θi, any k-increment auction, and any
equilibrium with τ -logit errors. Let vIni,j,k,θi denote the continuation value (given i’s
arbitrary beliefs) of playing In at clock price jk .
P ([i does not quit before ] ∩ [ some j ∈ N \ i does not quit before ])
≤ P (i does not quit before | some j ∈ N \ i does not quit before )
=
Mk∏
j=0
e
τvIni,j,k,θi
e
τvIni,j,k,θi + e0
≤
Mk∏
j=0
eτ
eτ + e0
(77)
The last inequality holds because, for any beliefs, i’s payoff from the k-increment
ascending auction is bounded above by 1. Moreover,
P (closing price above )
= P (
⋃
i∈N
[[i does not quit before ] ∩ [ some j ∈ N \ i does not quit before ]])
≤
∑
i∈N
P ([i does not quit before ] ∩ [ some j ∈ N \ i does not quit before ])
≤ |N |
Mk∏
j=0
eτ
eτ + e0
(78)
limk→∞M k = ∞, so limk→∞
∏Mk
j=0
eτ
eτ+e0
= 0. Consequently, we can pick k large
enough that, for all k ≥ k, the right-hand side of the above equation is less than , which
completes the proof.
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Table 12: AQRE computed for simplified auctions
mean(abs(2nd bid - 2nd value))
τ 2nd-Price Ascending
0 4.57 11.61
2−4 4.34 11.52
2−2 3.79 11.06
1 2.69 9.32
22 1.63 5.91
24 0.91 2.67
As Proposition 8 indicates, in any ascending auction with fine enough bid increments,
models such as logit-AQRE or na¨ıve logit predict extreme underbidding.
In the auctions in my experiment, the range of types is $120 and bid increments
are 25 cents. It is not feasible to compute AQRE for these auctions. Players have 481
possible types and there are 601 possible bids. Consequently, the pure strategy space in
2P and 2P+X is of the order of 601481 ≈ 101336, and larger yet in AC and AC+X,
since there are multiple payoff-equivalent strategies of each kind (specifying different
actions at information sets that are never reached).
However, I compute logit-AQRE for the following simpler games: There are 4 agents,
with types drawn independently and uniformly at random from 0.25 to 20 (in 0.25
increments). Agents either play a second-price auction with 80 possible bids (equal to
the types), or an ascending clock auction with 80 clock prices.
I compute symmetric logit-AQRE for τ ∈ {0, 2−4, 2−2, 1, 22, 24}, and sample 106 plays
for each game-parameter pair. Table 12 displays the average absolute difference between
the second-highest bid and the second-highest value, by τ and auction format. For every
computed parameter value, AQRE predicts larger errors in the ascending auction than
in the second-price auction, which is the opposite of the effect in the experimental data.
For the simplified auctions that I computed, Table 13 displays the average difference
between the second-highest bid and the second-highest value predicted by AQRE. Com-
paring Table 12 and Table 13 indicates that the large errors in ascending auctions under
AQRE are driven almost entirely by under-bidding.
As Figure 2a and Figure 2b illustrate, there is no evidence of systematic under-bidding
in AC and AC+X. Table 10 shows this rigorously.
For further robustness, I compute a ‘na¨ıve’ alternative to AQRE: Agents make logistic
errors at each information set, while believing that their opponents (and their future
selves) play their dominant strategies63. Table 14 displays the average absolute difference
63In ascending auctions, there are multiple payoff-equivalent dominant strategies, which prescribe
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Table 13: Directional Errors under AQRE
mean(2nd bid - 2nd value)
τ 2nd-Price Ascending
0 0.01 -11.61
2−4 -0.33 -11.52
2−2 -0.83 -11.06
1 -0.75 -9.32
22 -0.32 -5.91
24 -0.06 -2.65
Table 14: Na¨ıve logistic errors computed for simplified auctions
mean(abs(2nd bid - 2nd value))
τ 2nd-Price Ascending
0 4.57 11.61
2−4 4.35 11.59
2−2 3.89 11.52
1 2.86 10.71
22 1.68 6.02
24 0.91 2.43
between the second-highest bid and the second-highest value, by τ and auction format.
This model also predicts larger mistakes in ascending auctions than in second-price
auctions.
The preceding results suggest that models in which agents make payoff-sensitive mis-
takes independently at every information set are substantially at odds with the data.
They predict that ascending auctions with fine increments will induce extreme under-
bidding, and that errors should be larger in ascending auctions than in second-price
auctions. One could invent new theories that permit non-independent errors across in-
formation sets or different accuracy parameters for different games, but this introduces
many new degrees of freedom, and may have little testable content.
different actions at prices above the agents’ values. For the purpose of these computations, I assume
that agents believe that they will quit at all such information sets.
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